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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF
RECOVERY SERVICES,
PlaintiffRespondent,
Case No. 860673

V,

BETTY A. WHITAKER,
DefendantAppellant.

,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in refusing to dismiss

plaintiff's complaint when an administrative proceeding was
pending between the same parties for the purpose of adjudicating the identical issues?
2.

Did plaintiff meet its burden of proof in estab-

lishing the correct amount of overpayment claimed under its
verified complaint?
3.

Did the district court err as a matter of law in

holding that the one-half equity interest in the home was
actually available to defendant?
4.

Did the district court err in awarding plaintiff

attorney fees when the record contains no evidence on this
claim?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment (Appendix
"A") entered against defendant on November 24, 1986 which
ordered and decreed that plaintiff was to have and recover
judgment against defendant for $1,985.38-

The judgment was

awarded following a trial before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde
who entered his memorandum decision on October 14, 1986.
(Appendix "B") In his decision, Judge Hyde found that defendant
had received public assistance benefits to which she was not
entitled because of an equity interest in a home which she had
received as part of a divorce settlement.
Plaintiff initiated this action on October 16, 1985
by the filing of a complaint with the district court alleging
that the defendant had received public assistance overpayments.
At the time the complaint was filed, defendant was contesting
the alleged overpayment through administrative procedures
established by the Office of Recovery Services (nORS,f). Plaintiff filed its complaint for the express purpose of obtaining a
pre-judgment writ of attachment which was entered by Judge Hyde
on October 16, 1985 (Appendix "C") and continued by Judge John
F. Wahlquist on October 23, 1985.

(Appendix

ff ff

D ) Defendant

filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the basis
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case,
since the statute required plaintiff to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking further relief in the district court.
On December 26, 1985, Judge Hyde denied defendant's motion and

- 3-

defendant sought permission for appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court which was denied.

A trial was then held before Judge

Hyde on October 2, 1986 which resulted in his Memorandum
Decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Public Assistance System in Utah
The state of Utah provides public assistance to needy
persons under authority found at U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-l ejt seq.
Among other forms of assistance available, Utah administers a
state General Assistance program ("GA") which provides cash
payments to the unemployable.

U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-17. It

provides limited medical assistance to those suffering acute or
life-threatening illnesses under the Utah Medical Assistance
program.

(Formerly designated Indigent Medical) ("IM").

Finally, Utah participates in the federally funded Food Stamp
program and administers benefits through its state agency and
local district offices.

The federal authority for the Food

Stamp program is found at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.
Recovery of Overpayments
The authority establishing the public assistance
programs further establishes income and resource limitations
which applicants must comply with in order to receive benefits.
The statute provides, in part, that after certain exceptions
are applied (home, automobile) single individuals may not own
real or personal property exceeding $1,500.00 in value.

U.C.A.

§ 55-15a-15(3). A recipient who is found to have exceeded this
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requirement is determined to have incurred an overpayment.

The

determination of whether an overpayment has been incurred is
made by the DSS district office where the recipient resides. A
Notice of Decision is mailed to the recipient advising of the
determination and setting forth the recipient's hearing rights.
The state authority for determining and recovering
public assistance overpayments is found at U.C.A. Sec.
55-15a-24.

The statute provides in relevant part:

(1) Any person who engages in any of the
following acts shall be liable to the state
of Utah for the value of all funds or other
benefits received by any person as a result
of those acts:
a.
receiving assistance payments, medical
services, food stamps or any other
thing of value under the provisions of
this chapter, to which they were not
entitled.

The statute further provides authority for recovery of the
overpayment:
(7)(a) The department [DSS] shall take all
necessary steps to recover the repayments
required under this section; however, the
department under administrative rules may
use discretion in recovering small overpayments unintentionally received as a result
of administrative error. In addition to
other authorized procedures, it may file a
civil action against any individual,
corporation, business or association
determined by it to owe money to this state
under this section. If an action is filed,
the,department may recover, in addition to
the principal sum plus interest, a reasonable amount as attorneys1 fees and its
costs incurred. If the repayment obligation
arises from overpayment due to administrative error, attorney's fees and interest
may not be recovered. U.C.A. §
55-15a-24(7)(a).

D

A recipient notified of an overpayment determination
is given certain rights to contest the overpayment through a
hearing at the administrative level.

The relevant statute

provides, in part:
Any applicant for, or recipient of, assistance, food stamps, or medical assistance
aggrieved because of a decision or delay in
making a decision, may appeal and is
entitled to reasonable notice and a hearing. U.C.A. § 55-15a-25
The Office of Recovery Services (ORS), a branch of
DSS, is responsible for the collection of overpayments.
Pursuant to its authority to collect overpayments, ORS has
issued regulations outlining certain procedures for the administrative hearing process.

(Appendix "E")

ORS introduces its

regulations by noting that its procedures are a necessary part
of the legal system for determining and recovering overpayments :
Due to the nature of ORS collection programs, the assistance of the legal system
is often sought. In many cases civil or
criminal proceedings may be initiated to
enforce collections and to act as a deterrence to continued program fraud and abuse.
In addition, federal regulations require
states to provide an administrative hearing
process in several programs administered by
the Bureau of General Collections.
The objective of this section is to outline
the procedures for the administrative
hearing processes and for pursuing civil/criminal actions. Vol. Ill § 200
The ORS regulations then go on to set forth in detail a recipient's rights in regard to a fair hearing.
Sec. 200 et seq.

Utah-DSS-ORS Vol III

The regulations make clear that the fair

- 6 -

hearing process applies to financial, medical and Food Stamp
overpayments. Vol. Ill § 201. The regulations further establish that an ORS team supervisor or a designated investigator
is to prepare and present the department's case at the hearing.
Vol III § 202.3.

The fair hearing officer is required to issue

a decision setting forth findings of fact and advising the
recipient of the right to appeal an unfavorable decision. Vol.
Ill Sec. 202.6.

Within twenty days of an unfavorable decision,

a recipient may appeal a decision to the director of administrative hearings (Vol. Ill Sec. 202.11), who is the administrative hearing examiner referred to in the statute.

The regula-

tion further advises that any further appeals must be made
through the legal process. Vol. Ill Sec. 202.11-1.c.

Finally,

the regulations provide that an administrative decision does
not prohibit the department from initiating a civil action in
court.

Vol. Ill § 202.11-2.

(Emphasis added)

The statute further establishes that either party may
obtain further review of an unfavorable hearing decision.

The

statute provides, in part:
The department through its administrative
hearing examiner may, upon its own motion,
review any decision of a local or district
office and consider and determine any
application upon which a decision has not
been made within a reasonable time. U.C.A.
§ 55-15a-25.
After the remedies available at the administrative
level have been exhausted, the statute then provides for
judicial review:
All decisions of the administrative hearing
examiner are final and binding upon any
- 7 -

local, district, or state office, except
that any party may appeal an administrative
order to the district court and obtain a
trial de novo of the matter by filing a
petition in the appropriate district court
within 30 days after receipt of notice of
the administrative order. . . .
ORS has established a second procedure for determination and recovery of overpayments through the administrative
process.

Vol. Ill Sec. 240 et seq.

(Appendix "F") The

regulations, promulgated in February, 1985, cite as their
authority U.C.A. Sec. 55-15e-l.

(Appendix "G")

The statute

makes clear that it was enacted to give ORS authority to
establish through the administrative process the existence of a
public assistance overpayment and to have that determination
reduced to an administrative order which can be docketed as a
judgment in the district court.

U.C.A. §§ 55-15e~2,-4,-8. The

statute allows for judicial review after completion of the
administrative hearing process:
When findings and an order have been
entered by the administrative hearing
examiner subsequent to a hearing, judicial
review of those findings and order may be
secured by any person adversely affected
thereby by filing a petition in the district court. . .U.C.A. § 55-15e-6(l).

- 8-

Facts Relevant to the Determination and Recovery of an Alleged
Overpayment To Defendant
Defendant was divorced from her husband on December
8, 1981. On May 19, 1983, she applied to DSS for Indigent
Medical Assistance and Food Stamps.

(R-97-100)

Her case was

opened and subsequently closed in November, 1983.

Defendant

made a second application for IM and Food Stamps on January 4,
1984, which case was closed March 30, 1984. (Rlll-14) Defendant made a third application for GA, IM and Food Stamps on May
2, 1984.

(R101-04)

This case was closed effective November

30, 1984, based on alleged excess resources.
On November 14, 1984, a Notice of Decision was issued
by DSS advising defendant that her assistance case would be
closed because her assets were greater than policy allowed.
(Appendix "H")

On November 19, 1984, defendant received a

letter from ORS Investigator Terry Schow, notifying her that
she had been overpaid $1,116 in Food Stamps for the time period
of June, 1983 through July, 1984.

(Appendix "1-1").

In his

letter, Schow advised that failure to contact him would require
ORS to take a different and stronger legal course of action.
Defendant received a second letter from Mr. Schow, dated
December 6, 1984, notifying her that she had been overpaid $80
in GA financial assistance for the time period of May, 1984
through October, 1984.

(Appendix "1-2").

Finally, on December

12, 1984, Schow sent defendant a third letter advising of
possible further legal action.

(Appendix "1-3").

- 9 -

Through a representative at Utah Legal Services,
defendant requested a fair hearing on or about December 26,
1984, by the filing of Form 490 as provided in Utah-DSS-ORS
Vol. Ill §201,1 (Appendix "J").

Owing to defendant's illnesses

and other causes, a hearing on her request was not held until
September 17, 1985, before Fair Hearing Officer Neal Bernson.
Defendant was represented at the hearing by Utah Legal Services
attorney Curt Child who presented testimony and other evidence
as well as a brief.

ORS was represented by Investigator Terry

Schow who presented the case for the state.

The Fair Hearing

Officer took the matter under advisement.
On August 26, 1985, before the administrative fair
hearing and before the filing of plaintiff's verified complaint, ORS served defendant with the necessary papers for the
determination of an overpayment pursuant to U.C.A. § 55-15e-l
and the regulations at Utah-DSS-ORS §§ 240 et seq. (Appendix
"K") The "Notice
1.
2.
3.
4.

Packet" served included:

Notice of Overpayment Determination,
Form 743.1;
Notice of Informal Settlement Conference, Form 743.2;
Legal Rights/Written Answer, Form 826;
and
Income/Asset Affidavit (Appendix M K " ) .

The forms served were all of those required by ORS regulations
for the determination and recovery of an overpayment through
the administrative process. Utah-DSS-ORS Vol. Ill § 241.2.
The notices were signed by T, Schow, Investigator.
On October 16, 1985, plaintiff filed its Verified
Complaint (Appendix "L") seeking recovery of the same
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overpayment at issue before the Fair Hearing Officer and the
subject of the ORS Notice of Overpayment served by T. Schow on
August 26, 1985.

On the basis of its complaint, plaintiff

received a pre-judgment writ of attachment in the amount of
$2,500 from a payment to be made to the First District Court
clerk's office, representing a portion of defendant's share of
a divorce settlement.

A hearing was held on plaintiff's

pre-judgment writ of attachment on October 21, 1985 and the
Order continued by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist.

The Court

further ordered that plaintiff post a bond in the amount of
$5,000.
On October 24, 1985, defendant filed her motion to
dismiss, asserting a lack of jurisdiction in the district
court.

On November 5, 1985, in an apparent effort to improve

its legal position in resisting the motion to dismiss, ORS,
through its representative T. Schow, Investigator, filed a
Notice of Dismissal of Notice of Overpayment Determination
(Appendix

f!

M") . Defendant's counsel objected to the attempted

dismissal and no order was ever issued by the administrative
hearing examiner dismissing plaintiff's Notice of Overpayment
Determination.

On December 26, 1985, defendant's Motion to

Dismiss was denied.

On August 11, 1986, Fair Hearing Officer

Neal Bernson issued a hearing decision in defendant's case in
»

which he declined to consider the legal issues raised, but
sustained the decision of the district office in finding an
overpayment.

The decision was appealed to the administrative

hearing examiner who has not issued a decision.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Point I, defendant argues that the district court
erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Defendant sets out the statutory authority for

the recovery of overpayments and the regulations which the
state of Utah has promulgated for the purpose of such collection.

She then argues that the plain language of these stat-

utes and regulations require the state to first exhaust administrative remedies before initiating an action at the judicial
level.

She explains the reasoning behind the doctrine, the

applicable exceptions and concludes that the doctrine was
applicable in this case.
In Point II, defendant argues that plaintiff failed
to carry its burden of proof in establishing the actual amount
of overpayment alleged.

She examines the exhibits and testimo-

ny offered by plaintiff to prove this element of its case and
concludes that the weight of the evidence was insufficient,
since the exhibits relied on were summaries of information
compiled by persons not present at the trial to testify.
In Point III, defendant urges that the court erred as
a matter of law in finding that the asset in question was
available to her.

She reviews the long line of federal and

state authority interpreting the term "actually available" and
concludes that the equity interest was not includable as a
resource until the payment representing her portion of the
equity interest was paid into the court.

- 12 -

In Point IV, defendant points out that no record was
established to support plaintiff's claim for attorney fees and,
accordingly, the judgment should be corrected to strike the
award,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE
In his ruling on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated
December 26, 1985, (Appendix "N") Judge Hyde stated in part:
"I can determine no statutory prohibition
against the state commencing this action,
and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not appear to be
applicable."
Defendant submits that when plaintiff's complaint is considered
in light of relevant statutory authority and case law, it
should be concluded that the statute required plaintiff to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided before seeking
further relief at the judicial level.
The only language in plaintiff's complaint which can
arguably be construed as an allegation of jurisdiction is
contained in the equivocal wording of paragraph 4 which provides:
The defendant has a duty to repay the
overpayment, but has refused to do so.
Defendant has requested a fair hearing
before the District II (A) OCO-APA Office
and the hearing officer has taken the
matter under advisement. If the hearing
officer rules against the defendant, it is
doubtful that she will pay the debt and
direct action against her would be
- 13 -

required. If the hearing officer rules
against the State, the State has a right to
obtain a trial de novo before the District
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
55-15a-25, which would require direct
action against the defendant. This complaint is filed for either purpose.
Far from being an allegation of facts conferring present
jurisdiction on the district court, the paragraph posits
jurisdiction with the court based upon events which have not
yet occurred:

(1) An unfavorable administrative decision which

defendant refused to pay or (2) a decision favorable to defendant which would trigger plaintiff1s right to a trial de novo
under U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-25. At the time plaintiff filed its
complaint, neither event had occurred.

Instead, the very

issues which plaintiff sought to litigate in the district court
were pending in the administrative system pursuant to rules and
regulations promulgated by plaintiffs for that very purpose.
Plaintiff's deficient assertion of jurisdiction is an
implicit acknowledgment that the requirements of the statute
for filing a judicial action had not yet been met. Specifically, U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-25 required the issuance of an administrative order before a party would be permitted to seek review
by trial de novo in the district court.

Similarly, U.C.A. §

55-15e-l required the issuance of "findings and an order" by
the administrative hearing examiner prior to seeking judicial
review. U.C.A. § 55-15e-6.

Plaintiff at the time of filing its

complaint had neither findings nor an order issued by the
administrative hearing examiner.

Moreover, plaintiff's own

regulations acknowledge that a civil action may follow a
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decision at the administrative level, but do not mention
concurrent proceedings.
Significantly, neither statute even uses the word
"complaint" in describing the further judicial review available.

Instead, the statutes use the term "petition" as the

proper pleading for obtaining a trial de novo or judicial
review.

U.C.A. § 55-15a-25; U.C.A. § 55-15e-6.

Nowhere in

plaintiff's complaint is there an assertion of jurisdiction
based on facts existing as of October 16, 1985; nowhere is
there an assertion of statutory authority for filing a complaint in district court.

Plaintiff's pleading is simply

devoid of allegations sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of
the district court on October 16, 1985.
In its argument before the district court, plaintiff
relied heavily on U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-24(7)(a) to support its
attempt to confer jurisdiction on the district court.

More

specifically, plaintiff identified the following language as
the basis for its action:
"In addition to other authorized procedures, it may file a civil action against
any individual . . . "
The cited language, which on its face is permissive, cannot be
reasonably interpreted as allowing plaintiff to commence a
civil action when the matter is already being litigated through
administrative procedures.

It is reasonable to conclude that

the legislature intended to permit plaintiff a choice of forums
before the commencement of an action but did not intend to
permit the concurrent litigation of the same case at both the
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administrative and judicial levels. More appropriately, the
cited language would apply when a defendant had not requested
an administrative hearing, or had exceeded the ninety-day time
limit for requesting such a hearing, and it was determined
necessary by plaintiff to initiate a civil action in circuit or
district court.
The

lf

[i]n addition to other authorized procedures"

language can reasonably be read as referring to the procedure
for determination of overpayments by ORS under U.C.A. §
55-15e-l et: seq.

As the scenario of events outlined previously

shows, ORS initiated such procedures on August 26, 1985 when it
served defendant with its Notice Packet under Vol. Ill § 240 et
seq.

Under that procedure, ORS, if successful, would be

entitled to an administrative order which it could docket as a
judgment.

Although the statute allows for other procedures to

recover an overpayment, it does not authorize the concurrent
utilization of procedures in both the administrative and
judicial forums.

Plaintiffs, by their actions, have caused the

incongruous result of actions proceeding under three separate
grants of authority:
1.

The fair hearing procedure under
U.C.A. § 55-15a-25 and Utah-DSS-ORS
Vol. Ill §§ 201 et seq.;
2.
The Administrative Determination of
Overpayments procedure under U.C.A. §
. 55-15e-l et seq. and Utah DSS-ORS Vol.
Ill §§ 240 et seq.; and
3.
The judicial procedure under plaintiff's assertion of possible, future
jurisdiction.
If the language of U.C.A. § 55-15a-24(7)(a) is read
as a broad grant of authority for plaintiff to initiate civil
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actions while concurrently pursuing the same result through the
administrative system, then a wasteful and disruptive element
is introduced into the Utah decisionmaking process. The
undesirable consequences of possible conflicting judgments,
waste of court and attorney time are so obvious as to require
little explication.
It is well established in Utah law that before a
matter pending before an administrative agency may be reviewed
in district court, a plaintiff must first have exhausted
administrative remedies.

Johnson v. Utah State Retirement

Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Ut. 1980).

The holding in Johnson is

particularly relevant to the issues under consideration in this
case.

In Johnson, employees of Payson City Hospital brought an

action to recover employer contributions to the state retirement fund.

The relevant section of the Utah State Retirement

Act provides that a determination by the

retirement board is

final, "except that a member if he so desires may appeal the
decision of the board to a district court of the state of
Utah."

Id, at 1237. The court observed:
"Pursuant to this provision, an adverse
determination by the administrator must be
reviewed by the board of review before the
right to judicial review attaches. The
right of appeal afforded a dissatisfied
member is statutory and dependent upon
compliance with the terms of the statute
authorizing such review. Ross v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 9, 307 P.2d 612 (1957).
See Campbell Building Co. v. State Road
Comm'n, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937).
Id, at 1237.
In State Department of Social Services v, Higgs, 656

P.2d. 998, 1001 (Ut. 1982) the Court considered U.C.A. §
- 17 -

67-19-25 (State Officers and Employees), which permits district
court review of an unfavorable personnel review board decision.
The Court stated:
The complaint filed in the district court
did not validly invoke the jurisdiction of
the district court because there was no
then existing statute authorizing the
exercise of such jurisdiction. Therefore,
Archer and Agee are not dispositive. The
statute in effect when the State filed, its
complaint in the district court required
defendants to complete all available
administrative procedrues prior to filing
a petition for judicial review in the
district court, and this the State failed
to do. It is elementary that administrative remedies, except in rare instances,
must first be exhausted before resort may
be had to judicial review. Johnson v. Utah
State Retirement Bd., Utah, 621 P.2d 1234
(1980); Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 595
(1962). Thus, under the law in effect at
the time of filing the complaint, the
Personnel Management Act, the district
court correctly held that the administrative procedures had not been exhausted and
properly dismissed the complaint.
Applying the same reasoning, the Court in Merrihew v. Salt Lake
County Planning, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Ut. 1983) held that
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to
seeking judicial review of the denial of a building permit.
In Clark v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 914, 916 (Ut. 1981) the
Court noted that under the statute in question (U.C.A.
§73-3-14), once a rehearing on an application to appropriate
water rights had been granted, judicial review was premature.
The Court then summarized several good reasons for requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies:
In the case at hand we deal with an administrative agency that has expertise in an
area that requires highly technical
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knowledge. The Engineer must render orders
on the best technical evidence available
and often in the absence of conclusive evidence. We recognize that despite these
facts, the Legislature has provided for a
trial de novo of the agency's determination. Nevertheless, full play must be
accorded the administrative process,
including a rehearing of the issues in this
case. Nor do we see any prejudice to the
plaintiffs since the Engineer's decision
might be favorable to them. Id., at 916.
The Court's reasoning applies with equal force to the
issue raised in this appeal.

The administrative hearing office

established by plaintiff has expertise in a highly specialized
area of law: eligibility for public assistance.

The relevant

statutes and regulations governing eligibility for financial,
medical and Food Stamps comprise several volumes at the state
and federal levels.

The regulations change regularly and

require a specialized expertise that does not exist outside the
Social Services system.

The hearing officer and administrative

hearing examiner handle a multitude of public assistance cases
and have a ready familiarity with the facts and issues of law
presented.

Although U.C.A. § 55-15a-l provides for a trial de

novo, there is good reason for allowing the administrative
process to run its course before involving the judicial system.
The wisdom contained in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been well expressed in decisions by
the United State Supreme Court.

In McKart v. United States,

395 U.S. 185, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d. 194 (1969) the
Supreme Court noted that application of the doctrine to specific cases "requires an understanding of its purposes and of the
particular administrative scheme involved.f!
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Id, at 203. The

Court then delineated those cases in which the doctrine is
relevant, including cases where the relevant statute provides
that administrative procedures are exclusive.

The Court

opined:
The reasons for making such procedure
exclusive, and for the judicial application
of the exhaustion doctrine in cases where
the statutory requirement of exclusivity is
not so explicit, are not difficult to
understand. A primary purpose is, of
course, the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process. The
agency, like a trial court, is created for
the purpose of applying a statute in the
first instance. Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the
necessary factual background upon which
decisions should be based. And since
agency decisions are frequently of a
discretionary nature or frequently require
expertise, the agency should be given the
first chance to exercise that discretion or
to apply that expertise. And of course it
is generally more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without
interruption than it is to permit the
parties to seek aid from the courts at
various intermediate stages. The very same
reasons lie behind judicial rules sharply
limiting interlocutory appeals.
Id, at 203.
The second reason identified by the Supreme Court was that the
exhaustion doctrine is "an expression of executive and administrative autonomy."

M , at 203. The Court observed that

administrative agencies are created as separate entities and
invested with powers and duties which should not be interfered
with until the agency has completed its action. Id.

Finally,

the Court noted that judicial review may be hindered in certain
cases by failing to allow the agency to ffmake a factual record,
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or to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise." Id.

The

Court added:
In addition, other justifications for
requiring exhaustion in cases of this sort
have nothing to do with the dangers of
interruption of the administrative process.
Certain very practical notions of judicial
efficiency come into play as well. A
complaining party may be successful in
vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue
his administrative remedies, the courts may
never have to intervene. And notions of
administrative autonomy require that the
agency be given a chance to discover and
correct its own errors. Finally, it is
possible that frequent and deliberate
flouting of administrative processes could
weaken the effectiveness of an agency by
encouraging people to ignore its procedures. Id.
Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
necessary and well established doctrine in the jurisprudence of
administrative law, it is not absolute.
subject to certain exceptions.

Like any rule it is

The administrative agency may

be bypassed where the issue is one of constitutionality.
Sandia Savings and Loan Assn. v. Kleinheim, 391 P.2d 324 (N. M.
1964).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies may also be

avoided when the agency lacks jurisdiction to hear the case.
State of Alaska Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hours Div. v. Alaska,
664 P.2d 575 (Alaska, 1983).

The doctrine may not apply when

the statute authorizing the administrative remedy provides that
the remedy is permissive only and not exclusive of the judicial
remedy.

Farmers Investment Company v. Arizona State Land

Dept., 666 P.2d 469 (Ariz. App. 1982).

Finally, exhaustion is

not required when to do so would involve irreparable injury.
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Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vol. Ill, 1958, §28.01 and
§20.08.
A review of the record in this case shows that none
of the exceptions apply.

Plaintiff did not allege in its

complaint any constitutional issue, nor did it assert that
jurisdiction was lacking at the administrative agency level.
The plain language of the statutes involved direct the conclusion that once a matter is pending in the administrative level,
the administrative remedy is exclusive and not permissive in
nature.

Under established Utah Law, as discussed previously,

the doctrine would apply.
Although plaintiff initiated its action for the
express purpose of obtaining a pre-judgment writ of attachment,
a careful review of plaintiff's pleadings and the record shows
that the likelihood of irreparable injury was non-existent.
Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that defendant had committed
fraud in obtaining public assistance, but dropped that claim at
the outset of the trial.

Plaintiff's witness Julia Bosley

(identified in the transcript as Judy Bosley) testified that
there was no evidence that defendant was intentionally trying
to deceive anyone.

(Transcript, at 80)

At the hearing held on

the writ of attachment before Judge Wahlquist, no evidence was
presented to establish that defendant intended to defraud her
creditors.

(R. 8) The entry in the record for October 21,

1985 shows that no testimony or affidavits were presented by
plaintiff in support of its petition for an extraordinary writ.
Therefore, the only basis for issuance of the writ was
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plaintifffs verified complaint.

The complaint contains no

averments of personal knowledge by the person verifying it
which showed that defendant was about to defraud any creditors.
Further, testimony at the date of trial showed that the amount
of money paid into the First District Court had not been
touched, even though defendant had the right to do so.

(Tran-

script, at 147-48).
The issuance of a pre-judgment writ of attachment is
a severe and harsh remedy and must be strictly construed.
Deseret Bank of Salt Lake City v. Little, Roundy and Company,
44 P. 930 (Ut. 1896).

The facts proffered by plaintiff were

insufficient to show a strong likelihood of irreparable injury
and, for that reason, the writ should not have been granted.
In view of the sound reasoning behind the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, compliance with the statute should
not have been excused in this case.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING THE AMOUNT
OF OVERPAYMENT ALLEGED OWING BY
DEFENDANT.
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant
was overpaid the following amounts:
A- GA financial:
B. Food Stamps:
C. .Medical:
TOTAL

$
80.00
1,166.00
131.88
$1,377.88

As to the amount of overpayment claimed, plaintiff had the
burden of proving this aspect of its case by a preponderance of
the evidence.

To meet its burden, plaintiff offered the
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testimony of Julia Bosley, a case supervisor at the Ogden
Office of Community Operations.

Ms. Bosley testified that she

had been the case supervisor in the Brigham City office at the
time defendant was determined by ORS to be ineligible for
public assistance.

(Transcript, at 56)

Plaintiff then intro-

duced as evidence exhibits P-4 (R 117-18), P-5 (R 116) and P-6,
(R 115).

Through the testimony of Ms. Bosley, plaintiff

established that the exhibits represented overpayment determinations prepared by persons employed in the district office.
Ms. Bosley testified that she herself had not prepared the
overpayment determinations and had no personal knowledge of the
information included therein.

(Transcript, at 81-82) Ms.

Bosley testified she had not compared the entries on the
exhibits with the case file, but had simply checked the calculations.

(Transcript, at 83)

On the morning of trial she

compared the exhibits with a microfiche prepared in Salt Lake,
but did not know whether the figures were accurate.

(Tran-

script, at 89). She stated she had no personal knowledge as to
whether the amounts of assistance claimed were actually issued
to defendant.

(Transcript, at 84)

She testified that the

actual checks would be in the archives in Salt Lake and that
ORS had access to them.

(Transcript, at 84).

As to the Food

Stamps, Bosley testified she compared the figures with a
payroll prepared in Salt Lake.

(Transcript, at 85)

She

testified she had no way of knowing how much medical assistance
had been provided, did not know whether the figures were
correct and had not compared the figures with actual invoices.
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(Transcript, at 86-87)

Plaintiff did not present evidence of

the actual public assistance checks issued to defendant,
evidence of Food Stamp coupons having been issued to defendant,
or invoices of medical services having been performed on
defendant's behalf.
At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant made a
motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) that
plaintiff's case be dismissed based on an insufficiency of
evidence establishing the amount of overpayment.

This motion

was denied by Judge Hyde.
The cited rule permits a court trying a case without
a jury to grant a motion to dismiss when it concludes "that
upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief,"

Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Company, 711 P.2d 250

252 (Ut. 1985).

The trial court is not precluded from granting

such a motion even though the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case.

Id.

The court has stated concerning the rule:

"The purpose of the rule is to permit the
judge, as the fact finder, 'to weigh the
evidence, to draw inferences therefrom, and
if it finds the evidence insufficient to
make out a case for the plaintiff, to
render a decision for the defendant on the
merits." Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping
Company, supra, at 252.
In this case, the trial judge erred in not dismissing
plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff had the burden of proving the

amounts of public assistance provided.

The evidence upon which

plaintiff sought to establish the amounts was incompetent,
since the exhibits represented summaries of information prepared by persons not present at the trial.
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The testimony of

Ms. Bosley was incompetent, since she herself had not prepared
the exhibits and had no personal knowledge of their content.
Amounts such as those sought to be recovered by plaintiff must
be ascertained in some manner other than speculation, conjec-

~ture or surmise.

Great Western Motor Vehicles, Inc. v. L. C.

Cozard, 417 P.2d 575, 578 (OK. 1966).

At least one court has

held that the failure by a state social services department to
introduce substantial evidence (a renter's refund check) in an
arrearage recovery case warranted denied of the claim.
v. AFSD, 677 P.2d 719 (Or. App. 1984).

Engman

Since plaintiff

introduced insufficient evidence in this case, it failed to
meet its burden of proof and its case should have been
dismissed.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE ONE-HALF EQUITY
INTEREST WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT.
The key issue considered at the trial was whether the
equity interest which defendant held in joint tenancy with her
ex-husband during the relevant time period constituted an
available resource, thereby disqualifying her from financial
assistance, medical assistance and Food Stamps.

It was estab-

lished that defendant was issued general assistance in the
amount of $80.00.

The asset standards for the GA Program are

found in APA Vol. II §810.4 and are based on the regulations
governing the Aid to Families of Defendent Children (AFDC)
program.

On this issue, the AFDC regulations provide, in part:
Only assets actually available to an
individual shall be considered in establishing eligibility. APA Vol. II §400
(Appendix "0")
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The federal regulations upon which the state regulations are
based state, in somewhat greater detail:
To the extent not inconsistent with any
other provision of this chapter, income and
resources are considered available both
when actually available and when the
applicant or recipient has a legal interest
in a liquidated sum and has the legal
ability to make such sum available for
support and maintenance. 45 C.F.R. Sec.
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (Appendix "P")
As to the meaning of "liquidated sum/1 the regulations provide:
liquid assets are those properties in the
form of cash or other financial instruments
which are convertible to cash and include
savings accounts, checking accounts,
stocks, bonds, mutual fund shares, promissory notes, mortgages, cash value of
insurance policies, and similar properties.
45 C.F.R. §233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F)(4) (Appendix
"P")

The state and federal regulations governing the food
stamp program provide that only those resources to which a
recipient actually has access should be counted as resources
for Food Stamp purposes.

APA Vol. IV Sec. 404 (Appendix "Q")

defines what items are to be considered as a household's
resources.

These definitions include both liquid and

rion-liquid resources and nearly mirror the federal regulations
(7 C.F.R. §273.8(c)) (Appendix "R").

However, the "actually

available11 provision for Food Stamp purposes is found in the
provisions for resource exclusions.

APA Vol. IV §406-8 (Appen-

dix "Q") provides, in relevant part, that,
Resources whose cash value is
ble to the household, such as
limited to, irrevocable trust
security deposit's on rental
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not accessibut not
funds,
property or

utilities, property in probate, and real
property which the household is making a
good faith effort to sell at a reasonable
price and which has not been sold [are
exempt].
The federal regulation at 7 C.F.R. §273.8(d)(8)
(Appendix "R") provides, in relevant part, that the following
are excluded from resources:
Resources having a cash value which is not
accessible to the household, such as but
not limited to, irrevocable trust funds,
security deposits on rental property or
utilities, property in probate, and real
property which the household is making a
good faith effort to sell at a reasonable
price and which has not been sold* The
State agency may verify that the property
is for sale and that the household has not
declined a reasonable offer. Verification
may be obtained through a collateral
contact or documentation, such as an
advertisement for public sale in a newspaper of general circulation or a listing
with a real estate broker.
The asset standards for the Indigent Medical Program
are specified in APA Vol. Ill §807 et. seq.

Section 807 pro-

vides, in relevant part, that "Assets are to be considered as
anything of value that is accessible to the individual."
(Appendix "S")•
The meaning of the term "actually available" has been
scrutinized by federal and state courts in a long line of
cases.

The seminal case in this inquiry is King v. Smith, 392

U.S. 309, 88 §. Ct. 2128, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 1118 (1967) wherein the
Court held that the income of an able-bodied man with whom a
mother cohabited could not be counted as available income.
Similarly, in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 90 S. Ct. 1282, 25
L. Ed. 2d. 561 (1970) the Court held that support from a
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non-adoptive stepfather (man assuming the role of spouse) could
not be considered actually available to the mother's children.
Since the Supreme Court's decisions in King and
Lewis, federal courts have reviewed and struck down many state
schemes for counting as available income that which was not
actually available, including:

John v. Harder, 383 F. Supp.

174 (D. Conn. 1974), afffd per curiam, 512 F. 2d 1188 (2d. Cir.
1975) (surplus OASDI benefits not held available to an AFDC
family); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger,
377 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1974) (income reduced by the recovery
of an overpayment held to not actually be available); Green v.
Barnes, 485 F. 2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1973) (encumbrance on a
home resulted in a portion of a resource being considered not
actually available); Owens v. Heckler, 753 F. 2d 675 (8th Cir.
198 5) (benefits received by AFDC caretaker relative actually
needed for educational expenses were excludable from income
available to AFDC applicant); Hayes v. City University of New
York, 503 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. New York 1980) (federal educational assistance for student's current living costs could not be
treated as available income); Granito v. Sunn, 594 F. Supp. 410
(D. Haw. 1984) (lump sum income already spent not considered
available for Medicaid eligibility purposes); and Hein v.
Burns, 402 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. la. C D . 1975) (travel allowances
received under a federal education and training plan excludable
from resources under the Food Stamp Act).
Courts which have considered the meaning of "actually
available" have done so with careful attention to the highly
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specialized context in which the term is used.

Thus, the Court

in Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Conn. 1971)
summarized:
Reasonable evaluation of available assets
in the context of eligibility for public
assistance must have reference to evaluation for purposes of meeting those present
needs for which assistance would otherwise
be provided. To be available, resources
must be fin-handf or 'under the control of
the individual'. Any other measurement of
value,...is irrelevant to whether a recipient can meet out of his own assets his
present subsistence needs.
A number of state courts have considered whether
certain assets in the context of public assistance eligibility
were actually available.

In Warlick v. Public Welfare Divi-

sion, 562 P. 2d. 223 (Or. App. 1977) the court held that
support monies owing to an AFDC recipient did not constitute
liquidated sums of money and were not available income to her
until actually paid to her.

Thus, the court held that amounts

received by the state in May, but not transmitted to the
recipient until June were income in June for purposes of
determining eligibility.

In Russell v. N.M. Human Services

Dept., 653 P. 2d 1224 (N.M. 1982) the Court held that an AFDC
recipient did not have access to the proceeds from the sale of
her home when it was transferred to pay debts to family members
who had assisted her.

In Frazier v. N.tA. Dept. of Human

»

Services, 645 P. 2d 454 (N.M. 1982) the Court held a real
estate contract to be not actually available since it was not
readily negotiable.

In Idaho Falls Consol. Hosp. v. Bd. of
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Commissioners, 712 P.2d 582 (Id. 1985) equity in a home below
the homestead exemption was not considered actually available.
When the findings of fact established by the district
court are considered in the light of the aforecited relevant
case law, it may properly be concluded that the equity interest
in the home at issue in the trial was not "actually available"
to defendant until the money was paid by her husband into the
First District Court.

The transcript of the trial shows that

the evaluation of the equity in the home was a matter of
serious dispute between defendant and her husband for a lengthy
period of time.

It must also be borne in mind that the rele-

vant time period for consideration of the asset being available
is from May, 1983 until November, 1984. The transcript shows
that during this time a real question existed in defendant's
mind as to the reasonable valuation of the property.

Defendant

sought to resolve that question through further court proceedings which culminated shortly before her trial.

Even at the

day of trial, defendant was not certain whether her right of
appeal had been finally extinguished.

(Transcript, at 147-48)

It was only after a lengthy court proceeding that the fair
market value of the equity interest was determined and that
amount paid into the First District Court.
The facts established in defendant's case are compa»

rable to those in Warlick and a similar result should follow.
Although defendant had some legal interest in the equity
interest it was not actually paid to her and received until
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after the relevant period.

Under the cited authority, it was

only then that the asset was actually available.
The transcript of the trial further shows that
defendant was not a person who set out to intentionally deceive
the state in regard to public assistance.

(Transcript, at 80)

She was a recently divorced woman, suffering from injuries and
unable to work (Transcript, at 139), unfamiliar with the
Welfare system and suffering emotional disturbance which caused
her to seek mental health counseling.

(Transcript, at 140-41)

She sought public assistance, primarily Food Stamps, because
she had limited income, no vocational skills and was unable to
support herself.

The testimony showed that the application

which she completed in order to receive public assistance did
not clearly advise her that an equity interest in a home
subject to legal dispute should be counted as an asset.
(Transcript, at 9)

Furthermore, the state's own employees in

the Brigham City district office did not inform her of the
full meaning of the questions on the application form.

(Tran-

script, at 91)
The federal Food Stamp Act, and arguably the state
Welfare Act as well, is remedial in nature and, therefore,
entitled to a broad construction consistent with its purpose.
Hein v. Burns, supra, at 404. That purpose is to safeguard the
»

health and well-being of U.S. citizens and to raise their level
of nutrition.

Id., at 404. There is no question that defen-

dant was in need of Food Stamps and the other forms of public
assistance when she applied for them.
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In view of this fact, a

broad construction should be given to the meaning of the term,
"actually available"•

Given defendant's circumstances the

Court may properly conclude that the resource in question was
not actually available.
POINT IV
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO DENY
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES SINCE THIS CLAIM
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD
In its complaint, plaintiff prayed for attorney fees
pursuant to U.C.A. §55-15a-24(7).

Plaintiff introduced no

evidence as to the reasonableness of any attorney fees during
the presentation of its case.

After the plaintiff had rested

its case, and after the matter had been submitted to the court,
plaintiff's counsel first raised the issue of attorney fees.
As the record reflects (R-88), plaintiff's counsel was permitted to take the stand and testify concerning attorney fees.
However, the transcript of the hearing contains no record of
any testimony concerning attorney fees.
Utah law is clear that a judgment, including one for
attorney fees, must be based upon evidence in the record.

FMA

Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 673 (Ut.
1965).

In this case, the Court stated:
Failing to offer proof of any character on
this issue had the same effect as would the
failure to offer proof as to any other
controverted issue. There is nothing upon
which to base a finding. The defendant's
objection that the finding as to attorney
fees is not supported by any evidence is
well taken and the judgment must be corrected in that particular. Id., at 674.
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Based upon the lack of evidence supporting a claim for attorneys fees, it should be concluded that plaintiff has failed to
carry its burden of proof on that issue and the judgment
corrected accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this /&

day of March, 1987.

^7u^^'^S^w
MICHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
MICHAEL D. SMITH
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Civil Enforcement Division
ROBERT D. BARCLAY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintff
2540 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 626-3512

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, Department of Social
Services, Office of Recovery Services,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 93725
BETTY A. WHITAKER,
Defendant.

The above matter came on regularly for trial on the 2nd day of
October, 1986, before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, sitting without a jury.
Robert D. Barclay, Assistant Attorney General, represented the plaintiff.
The defendant was present and represented by Michael Bulson, Utah Legal
Services.

Witnesses were sworn and testified and the parties argued their

respective positions, whereupon the court took the matter under advisement.
Having rendered its written Memorandum Decision, and made its separate
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that the plaintiff do have and
recover judgment against the defendant as follows:
$1,407.88
77.50
500.00

Principal
Costs
Attorney's fees

$1,985.38

TOTAL JUDGMENT

Appendix
1 O
Page

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 93725
Page 2
together with interest thereon at the rate of 121 from the date herein until
it is paid in full.
DATED this

day of October, 1986.

RONALD 0. HYDE, District Judge
0879D
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services, Office
of Recovery Services,
]i

Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

]

BETTY A- WHITAKER,
Case No.

93725

Defendant.

This
alleged

action

overpayments

was
of

filed
public

against

defendant

benefits

paid

period of June, 1983, through October, 1984.
overpayment

was

incurred

correct and complete

because

information

defendant

to

during

recover
the

time

Plaintiff alleges
failed

to

report

to plaintiff which would have

affected her eligibility for benefits.
In her

divorce

decree,

the

home, which

was

owned

in

joint tenancy, was ordered sold at fair market value and each of
the

parties

deduction

of

would
all

receive

one-half

mortgages,

of

the

commissions,

net

proceeds

closing

costs,

after
etc.

Following the entry of the decree, a subsequent hearing a stipulation

was

entered

purchase

the home.

into
The

providing

defendant

that

husband

either

party

offered

could

to pay her

$20,000 for her interest, which she would not accept.

She claims
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her

basis

more,
more.

for

because

non-acceptance
a real

estate

was

that

agent

had

the

property

told

her

was

worth

it was worth

As a factual matter, when it was finally forcibly sold by

Court order, it was worth less.

The true fact appears to be that

she did not want to sell the home under any circumstances, as she
was hoping for a reconciliation with her husband.
I hold that the money was actually

available, all she

would have had to do was to say she would take it, and he would
have had the funds within four to five days.

I further hold that

her refusal to accept it was unreasonable, and does to this day
remain unreasonable.

She has almost $17,000 held in the Clerk's

Office in Box Elder County, which to this day she has not picked
up.

Defendant did fail to report correct and complete informa-

tion in regard to the home.
Defendant

further

tion, which was not

so.

claims that
Even

though

the home was in litigashe disputed

the amount

unreasonably and made no effort to have it appraised and determine a correct amount, her interest was not in litigation.

Her

interest was set; it was one-half the equity; her ex-husband was
ready, willing and able to pay it to her at any time.
I hold
benefits

that

that

she

was

the
not

defendant
entitled

received
to, and

public
was

assistance

accordingly
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overpaid.
$500.00

Judgment to the plaintiff:
attorney's

fees.

$1,407.88, plus costs, and

Plaintiff's

attorney

to

prepare

findings, conclusions and judgment in accordance herewith.
DATED this

/ ^ day of October, 1986.

Ijn2*&6^
RONALD O. HYDE, Ju

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this li

day of October, 1986,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Robert D. Barclay
Attorney for Plaintiff
533 26th Street, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Mike Bulson
Attorney for Defendant
385 24th Street, Suite 522
Ogden, Utah 84401

X

l-XW\

PAULA CARR, Secretary
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Robert p. Barclay
Deputy Weber County Attorney
533 - 26th Streetf Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2354

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 03URT OF WEBER GOUNTOY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAHf Department of
Social Services, Office of
Recovery Servicesf

ORDER AND NOTICE
OF HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 9 3 7 2 ^

BETTY A* WHITAKER,
Defendant.
ORDER
TO THE CLERK OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT:

Upon consideration of the Verified Complaint filed in this matter and
finding that funds (approximately $17,574.3 9) have beenf or shortly shall bef
paid to the First District Court Qerk f in Civil Case No. 16570f on behalf of
Betty A. Whitaker by U q y d Whitaker; that the clerk would immediately forward
said funds to the defendant subject to an attorney's lien of record; and that
the defendant would thereafter dispose of said funds, thereby causing the
plaintiff to suffer irreparable injury, loss and damage in that the defendant
will not then have a fund from which the entire debt due to the plaintiff
herein can be paid.
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff is awarded an order of pre-judgment
attachment or garnishment. Accordingly, the First District Court CLerk shall
retain the sum of $2f500.00 from any funds presently held by or hereafter paid
to the CLerk on behalf of Betty A. Whitaker and hold the same pending further

/

/ < y/\( 5T
/ '''/ '"

it n ii
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Order and Notice of Hearing
Betty A. Whitaker

order regarding the disbursement of the $2,500,00. The balance of any funds
may be paid to the defendant and her former attorney, Randine Salerno,
pursuant to the attorney's lien on record with the Clerk.
IT IS FOKIHER ORDERED that this order shall expire ten (10) days from
the date and time it is issued unless (a) otherwise terminated at an earlier
date, or (b) continued by further order of the court after hearing.
DftTED this / n day of October, 1985, at X :3£b'clock p.m.

DISTRICT JUDGE

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THEffiOVE-NAMEDDEFENDANT:
Please take notice that hearing on the issuance and continuance of
the foregoing order shall cone before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 6th
Floor, south side, Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah, at 9:00 a.nu on Monday,
October 21, 1985.
! $ day of October, 1985.
DATED t h i s fr-

ROBERT D. BARCLAY
f
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

]

c

£wm OF W£35£tt
,R fiss:
\ HEFr-^

CF

^

~:-'-fc^

Copy

PAJcu r
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Robert D. Barclay
Deputy Weber County Attorney
-•-. * -- ~v- ^ 5 n
r
T
533 - 26th Street, Suite 200
> '~ p i1 /
Ogden, Utah 84401
V
Telephone: 621-2354
,•: ^
IN TOE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (XXJRT OP WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services, Office of
Recovery Services,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
BETTY A. WHITAKER,

Civil No. 93725

Defendant*
On October 16, 1985, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde signed an Order
whereby the First District Court Q e r k was ordered to retain the sum of
$2,500.00 from any funds presently held by or thereafter paid to the said
Q e r k on behalf of Betty A. Whitaker. Said Order was to have expired ten (10)
days from the date and time it was issued, unless terminated at an earlier
date or continued by further order of the above court after hearing.
On October 21, 1985, the matter came before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist for hearing. Robert D. Barclay, Deputy Weber County Attorney,
represented the plaintiff. The defendant was present and was represented by
Curtis L. Child, Utah Legal Services, Inc. After hearing the statements and
arguments of the parties, the court denied the defendant's objections to the
continuance of the Order and ruled that if the plaintiff filed an undertaking
in double the amount being retained, before 5:00 p.m., the order could be
continued until a complete resolution of the claiined debt has been made. At
3:56 p.m., the plaintiff filed an undertaking in the amount of $5,000.00.
Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the above-referenced Order signed by Judge Hyde
Anpendix "D"
Page 1 of 3

Page 2
Order, Civil #93725
Betty A* Whitaker

on October 16, 1985,

is continued and shall remain in full force and effect

until a final adjudication h*s been made on plaintiff's claim against the
defendant. Accordingly, the First District Court Clerk is ordered to continue
to retain the sum of $2,500.00 from any funds presently held by or hereafter
paid to the said Clerk on behalf of Betty A. Whitaker until (a) the plaintiff
obtains a judgment against the defendant and the Court further orders that the
money be released to the plaintiff in payment of such judgment, or (b) the
defendant obtains an order that plaintiff is not entitled to the alleged
judgment and the Court further orders that the money be released to the
defendant.
DATED this ^

"7 day of October, 1985, without being first submitted

as a proposed order since time is of the essence in notifying the First
District Court CLerk that the Order is continued; the defendant is reserved
the opportunity to request changes in the form of the Order should the same be

7
warranted.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order to the Attorney for the Plaintiff, Curt Childf Utah Legal
Services, Inc.f 385 - 24th Street, Suite 522, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this
day of October, 1985.

Secretary
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200-201.1
5-b3

BUREAU OF GENERAL COLLECTIONS
200

General Introduction
Due to the nature of ORS collection programs, the assistance of
the legal system is often sought. In many cases civil or criminal
proceedings may be initiated to enforce collection and to act as a
deterrence to continued program fraud and abuse.
In addition, federal regulations require states to provide an
administrative hearing process in several programs administered by
the Bureau of General Collections.
The objective of this section is to outline the procedures for the
administrative hearing processes and for pursuing civil/criminal
actions.

201

Fair Hearings
With regards to ORS programs, the f a i r hearing process applies to
the Financial
Overpayment, Medical Overpayment, Food Stamp
Overpayment, and Support Fraud Programs:

2U1.1

1.

The availability of a f a i r hearing is provided for in APA
Volume I I , I I I , and IV pertaining to financial, medical, and
food stamp assistance programs administered by the Utah
State Department of Social Services. The policy pertaining
to f a i r hearings stated in APA Volume I I , I I I , and IV also
applies to ORS.

2.

An obligor may request a f a i r hearing t o :
a.
Contest that a financial, medical, or food stamp
overpayment exists.
b.
Contest the amount of the overpayment!s).
c.
Contest the amount of the grant reduction or food
stamp allotment reduction.

2.

All requests for f a i r hearings must be made within
of the effective date of agency action.
ex. 1 In the case of a food stamp claim an obligor
not receiving benefits must request a f a i r
w,1thin yO days from the date of the i n i t i a l
l e t t e r from ORS.

90 days
wno is
hearing
demand

When an obligor/recipient disagrees with the agency's action, the
investigator or e l i g i b i l i t y worker shall explain the regulations
on which the action was based and attempt to resolve the issue.
The obligor/recipient should be asked i f they would like to have
an agency conference to resolve the issue.
I f the obligor/
recipient wants a f a i r hearing, the individual shall be provided
with a form 490, Request for Fair Hearing. The investigator or
e l i g i b i l i t y worker shall
not limit or interfer with the
individual's right to request a f a i r hearing.
Appendix
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202

Fair Hearing Scheduled
1.

202.1

202 - 202.5
5-83

The hearing officer must notify the obligor/recipient, the
d i s t r i c t office, and the ORS investigative team of the time,
date, and place of the hearing, and the issue to be heard.
This notice must be mailed at least ten days prior to the
date of the hearing unless a l l parties agree to an earlier
date.

Attempt to Resolve Issue
I f the hearing issue is resolved prior to the date of the hearing,
the hearing officer shall be notified by a l e t t e r signed by the
obligor, his/her representative, or the ORS or Field Service
representative.

202.3

The team supervisor or a designated investigator w i l l prepare for
the hearing and will
coordinate with the designated APA
representative.
1.

Both representatives w i l l be responsible f o r presenting the
department's case during the course of the hearing.

2.

The F i e l d Service representative w i l l address the issue of
the v a l i d i t y of the overpayment and the amount.
The ORS
representative w i l l address the issue of the amount of the

grant reduction, i f one has been i n i t i a t e d .
I t is not
necessary for an ORS representative to be present i f the
only issue to be heard is the validity and amount of the
overpayment; however, i t is advisable.
202.4

F a i r Hearing Not Open to Public
Only the hearing o f f i c e r , representatives and witnesses of APA and
ORS, the o b l i g o r / r e c i p i e n t , his representative and witnesses may
be present a t the f a i r hearing.

202.5

Procedure During Fair Hearing
1.

The hearing shall be conducted informally by the hearing
officer.
A statement of the problem by the hearing o f f i c e r ,
a statement by the F i e l d Service/ORS representatives and a
statement by the obligor shall be made.

2.

Pertinent evidence shall be presented by a l l p a r t i e s .
a.
An obligor and/or her representative shall have access
to case data which w i l l be used as evidence in the
hearing i n accordance with ORS Volume I I I section 105.
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202.6

202.5 (cont'd) - 202.8
5/«3

3.

The obligor shall have the opportunity to advance any
arquments without undue interference and to examine,
question or refute any testimony or evidence, including the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

4.

The decision shall not be based on hearsay evidence alone.
In addition to hearsay evidence, the d i s t r i c t office must
have at least one of the following:
a.
A person or persons willingness to testify at a
hearing.
b.
A signed statement by an individual.
c.
Worker's personal knowledge regarding the situation.
d.
Documents verifying the facts pertinent to the case.

Fair Hearing Decision
1.

After the f a i r hearing, the hearing officer shall issue a
written decision stating;
a.
The evidence presented at the hearing.
b.
Findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the
evidence on record.
c.
Applicable laws and regulations upon which the
decision was based.
d.
The obligor's right to appeal the decision and
possible e l i g i b i l i t y for free legal assistance.
e.
Mo Fair Hearing Decision shall rest on hearsay
evidence alone.

202.61

The decision w i l l be* issued within 60 days of tne date of
the hearing request unless the obligor presents reasonable
cause for a delay.

202.7

Hearing Communications
Copies of any written communication initiated by the Department of
Social Services during the decision making process, shall be sent
to the obligor and his representative.
The obligor shall be
allowed five working days to submit written rebuttal testimony.
1.

202.8

I f any additional factual evidence is submitted as a result
of such communication, the entire proceeding shall be
remanded to the hearing officer where the claimant and his
authorized representative shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to examine, confront and cross-examine such
witnesses or evidence.

Written Notice of Hearing Decision
Copies of the Hearing Decision shall oe mailed to the executive
director of the Department of Social Services, the State APA
Office and Field Service District Office, the ORS District Office,
the obligor and her authorized representative.
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1.

202.9

202.8 (cont'd) - 202.11
5/83

The hearing officer shall make a record of the hearing
request, the findings of f a c t , and the hearing decision.
This record shall be maintained in the office of the hearing
officer and shall be available to the APA ana ORS Office for
review.

Hearing Decisions are Binding
Hearing decisions are binding on both state and d i s t r i c t offices.
1.

The d i s t r i c t office and the Office of Recovery Services,
unless reversed by subsequent administrative approval or
court order, shall comply with the hearing decision within
ten days of the date the hearing decision is received.

2.

Within thirty days from the date of the hearing decision,
the d i s t r i c t director of APA shall review the case to assure
the d i s t r i c t office and.the Office of Recovery Services has
complied with the hearing decision.

3.

I f the hearing decision indicates a statewide misapplication
of policy, a corrective action evalution w i l l be made.

202.10 Hearing Decision Summaries are Available to the Public
. Summaries of Hearing Decisions shall be made available to the
public, APA, Field Service District Offices, and ORS without
violating instructions regarding the safeguarding of information.
2U2.11 Right of Appeal
1.

The obligor shall have the right to appeal a hearing
decision through the director of Administrative Hearings.
a.
The request for a review of the decision must be made
in writing within 20 days of the date the obligor
receives the hearing decision.
b.
The director shall
render a final
departmental
decision on the issues raised within H days of the
date the request is received.
c.
Any further appeals of the decision by the claimant or
the department shall be made through the legal process.

2.

An administrative hearing decision does not prohibit the
agency from initiating a c i v i l or criminal action in a court
of appropriate jurisdiction.
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203
5/83

Contested Overpayment
If a f a i r hearing i s requested t o contest the amount of the
overpayment but not that an overpayment e x i s t s , the D i s t r i c t APA
Office shall continue issuing the corrected grant minus the grant
reduction.
If a f a i r hearing i s requested t o contest the determination that
an overpayment e x i s t s or the amount of the grant reduction or
allotment reduction, the d i s t r i c t o f f i c e must reinstate the
original grant or food stamp benefits until a hearing decision i s
rendered.
An overpayment resulting from assistance issued until a hearing
decision i s rendered shall be recovered i f the decision of the
hearing supports the d i s t r i c t action.
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240 - 240.4

Administrative Process for Overpayments
240

Administrative Process for Overpayments
The purpose of this procedure is to establish an overpayment
obligation and to determine the cause of an overpayment through
the use of an administrative process and hearing procedure when
there is no prior court order.
Upon the determination that an overpayment was incurred or upon
default by the obligor, an order shall be issued. This order
shall be docketed in the court of appropriate jurisdiction and
shall be enforceable by law.
If the case involves a food stamp claim and a determination is
made by a hearing officer that the claim was incurred due to
intentional
program
violation,
the individual
shall
be
disqualified in accordance with appropriate Federal Regulation.

240.1

Legal Authority
Authority to establish overpayment obligations and to determine
the cause of the overpayment by administrative procedure i s found
in Section 55-15e-l, e t seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953.

240.2

Authority of the Department
The department through i t ' s director or his designee may
administer oaths, certify official a c t s , issue subpoenas, and
compel witnesses and the production of business records,
documents, and evidence.

240.3

Attorneys Fees and Court Costs
Except when an overpayment i s due to an administrative error, ORS
may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs from the obligor
incurred in pursuing administrative remedies.

240.4

Interest
Except when an overpayment is due to administrative error, the
department may recover interest at a rate not to exceed 1% per
month or 12% per annum on the amount due as stated in the default
or hearing order. The interest shall begin to accrue from the
date the order is issued. This is in addition to interest which
shall accrue on all amounts not paid to the department from the
time the obligation is discovered, at the rate of 8% per annum.
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Notice
I f an obligor is not subject to a current court order, send form
743.1, Notice of Overpayment Determination and form 743.2, Notice
of Informal Settlement Conference. Form 743.1 gives the obligor
three alternatives within 30 days from date of service:
1.
2.
3.

241.1

02/85
241 - 241.3

Pay the entire debt in f u l l .
Attend an informal conference with an investigator
Request a formal hearing.

Service of Notice
Service of the Notice of Determination of Overpayment shall be as
follows:
By certified mail, return receipt; or by a Sheriff of the
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by
any other person over the age of 21 years, and not a party
to the action.
By leaving a copy of such notice at his usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion.
Service of other papers shall be done in a manner pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

241.2

Notice Packet
The following forms should be included in the packet served on the
obligor:
1.
2.
3.
4.

241.3

Notice of Overpayment Determination, Form 743.1
Notice of Informal Settlement Conference, Form 743.2
Legal Rights/Written Answer, Form 826
Income/Asset Affidavit

Assessment/Settlement Conference
The obligor may respond and attend a Settlement/ Assessment
Conference. The purpose of the assessment conference is to:
1.

Make a final determination on the amount and cause of the
overpayment liability.

2.

Obtain a stipulation and agreement to establish a judgment.

3.

Obtain a Food Stamp disqualification consent agreement/when
appropriate.
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02/85
241.4 - 241.5

241.4 Stipulation and Judgment and Order
Upon completion of the conference and agreement by both parties,
prepare a stipulation and judgment and order. The obligor shall
sign the stipulation.
If payment is not made in full, the order shall be entered.
If monthly payment are negotiated, attempt to secure a wage
assignment.
Inform the obligor that his situation will be
reviewed at a later date. Send the order to the ORS Docket Clerk
who will docket the order and forward the abstract to the
appropriate court.
241.5 Food Stamp Claim
If the obligation involves an alleged intentional program
violation food stamp claim, the investigator must obtain a waiver
or consent agreement to establish an intentional program
violation. Inform the obligor that he will be disqualified from
future participation in the food stamp program based on this
determination in accordance with federal regulations.
If the obligor refuses to sign a consent agreement or waiver the
agency shall inform the obligor that either an administrative
disqualification hearing will be initiate or will on criminal
action may be filed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction to
determine the cause of the overpayment. If either form determines
that an intentional program violation has been committed the
obligor will be disqualified from participation in the Food Stamp
Program in accordance with federal regulation.
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Failure to Respond
If the obligor fails to respond to the department within 30 days
from the date of service of notice on the obligor, the department
may enter an administrative default order against the obligor.
1.

242.1

02/85
242 - 242.4

A disqualification may not be imposed if the judgment is
obtained by default absent Findings of Facts by a hearing
officer that an intentional program violation has accured
(see Vol. Ill 256.1).

Default Judgment and Order
If the obligor fails to respond to the notice within 30 days; or
if the obligor requests a formal hearing and fails to appear or,
If the obligor fails to request a formal hearing on the matter, a
default judgment and order shall be initiated.
The default judgment shall be mailed to the obligor*s last known
address by certified mail.

242.2 Preparation of Default Judgment and Order
1.
Initiate form 747.1, Default Judgment and Order.
2.
The order must be accompanied by form 747.3, Affidavit of
Default, and form 748.1, Abstract of Award.
3.
All forms shall be prepared in triplicate.
4.
A Notice of Administrative Order, letter 087.2, and a form
826, Legal Rights/Written Answer, shall Be" prepared in
duplicate and shall accompany the Default Judgment and Order
sent to the obligor.
These documents shall be arranged and forwarded to the Central
Docket Clerk according to Section 260, Docket Procedures.

242.4 Changes to the Computer (Reserved)
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243 - 243.1

Adverse Action Hearing Request
Any person adversely affected by an action of the department i s
entitled to a hearing under this section, except in the following
issues:
1.
2.

The amount of grant reduction.
The amount of assessed monthly payment.

To obtain a hearing the person must f i l e a request in writing with
either the Office of Recovery Services or the Office of
Administrative Hearings within 30 days after the person receives
notice of adverse action.
243.1

Location of the Hearing
The hearing shall be held in the person's county of residence or
other place convenient to the person.
The hearing
examiner.
1.

shall

be conducted by an administrative

hearing

The hearing shall be held within 30 days after the request
is f i l e d .
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250 - 250.3

Administrative Hearing to Determine Overpayment
1.
Any person adversely affected by an action of the department
taken pursuant to Section 55-15e-l, et. seq. UCA, 1953, as
amended, is entitled to a hearing. To obtain a hearing, the
person must file a request in writing with either the Office
of Recovery Services or the Office of Administrative
Hearings.
2.

A written request must be received within 30 days after the
person receives notification of adverse action.

3.

The hearing shall be conducted by an administrative hearing
examiner.

4.

The hearing shall be conducted within 30 days from the date
the request is filed.

250.1

The obligor may not request a hearing to contest:
1.
A matter of eligibility. These issues are heard under the
fair hearing procedures.
2.
The amount of grant reduction or allotment reduction. These
issues are heard under fair hearing procedures.
3.
The amount of assessed monthly repayment amount.
4.
A prior court order.
5.
A prior administrative disqualification hearing.
NOTE: Matters 4 and 5 must be addressed in the judicial forum.
250.2 Location of Hearings
1.
The hearing shall be held in the obligor's county of
residence or other place convenient to that person. With
the consent of the party who has requested the hearing, the
matter may be conducted by the use of a telephonic —
conferencing process, consistent with procedures which have
been promulgated by the Department in that regard.
250.3

Representation
1.
The Department may be represented by the Attorney General's
office or County Attorney upon request.
2.

An investigator or manager shall be present at all hearings
to present evidence and act as a witness where necessary.

3.

The Administrative Hearing Clerk will notify the investigator, the appropriate attorney and the obligor and the
obligor's attorney or representative of the hearing date and
time.
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250.4 - 250.5

250.4 Agency Response to Administrative Hearing Request
If the hearing request i s received by the Office of Recovery
Services, i t shall be forwarded to the Office of Administrative
Hearings within two days along with the following:
1.

The original or a copy of the form 743.1, Notice of
Overpayment Determination. A Notice of Default should be
attached if default i s the reason for the hearing.

2.

Proof of Service.

3.

An Affidavit of Default on all hearings regarding default
orders.

4.

The Default order where applicable.

5.

The original hearing request.

6.

Form 827 , Administrative Hearing Check List.

250.5 Case Preparation
Use form 827 , Administrative Hearing Check List, as a guideline
for preparing the case for the hearing.
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fuDiic wenare

any of its political subdivisions, if the office has
contracted to provide collection services or has been
ordered by a court or administrative authority to
enforce collection; and
(7) finance any costs incurred from collections. 19M
55-15c-5. Department as real party In interest Written consent to payment agreements •
Department's subrogation rights.
(1) The department shall be deemed a real party
in interest in any cause of action which the office is
pursuing because" ^the department has provided
public assistance.
(2) N o agreement between an obligee and any
obligor either relieving an obligation or purporting
to settle past, present, or future obligations, either
as settlement or prepayment, shall act to reduce or
terminate any rights of the department to recover
from that obligor for public assistance provided
unless the department has consented to the agreement in writing.
;(3) Any court order embodying a money judgment
to be paid to an obligee by any person shall be
deemed in favor of the department to the extent of
the amount of the department's subrogation rights.
1979

55-i5c-6. Director - Powers of office Confidential information from employers Legal representation - Receipt of grants or
stipends - Rules and regulations.
(1) The director o f the office shall be appointed
by the executive director of the department and
covered under the merit system.
(2) The office shall have power to administer
oaths, to certify to official acts, issue subpoenas,
compel witnesses and the production of books,
accounts, documents, and evidence.
(3) For purposes of this act, the office shall be
entitled to information from both public and private
employers regarding the name, address and social
security number of employees. Such information
shall be treated as confidential by the office,
(4) It shall be the duty of the attorney general or
the county attorney of any county in which a cause
of action can be filed, to represent the office.
(5) The office with department approval is authorized to receive any grants or stipends from the
federal government or other public or private source
designed to aid the efficient and effective operation
of t he recovery program.
(6) The office is authorized to adopt and enforce
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter.
1979
55-15c-7. Parent locator unit and medicaid fraud
unit designated criminal justice agencies.
The state parent locator unit within the office of
recovery services and the medicaid fraud unit are
designated as criminal justice agencies for the sole
purpose of requesting and obtaining access to criminal justice information, subject to appropriate
federal, state, and local agency restrictions governing the dissemination of such information.
i9Sl
55-15c-8. Collection of bail amounts - Writs of
,
garnishment or execution - Procedure.
(1) When the office is ordered by a court to
enforce collection of bail amounts, pursuant to
Subsection 77-7-19(3), the office may issue a writ
of garnishment or execution in the same manner,
and with the same effe/ct as if the writ were issued
on a judgment of a district court, after it has provided to the obligor no less than ten days written
notice of intent to administratively enforce the bail
amount. Notice shall be mailed by certified mail,

882

1986-1987

return receipt requested, to the obligor's last known
address on file with the United States Postal Service.
(2) A writ of garnishment or execution issued
under this section shall be signed by the director of
the office or his designee, and served in accordance
with rules of the department which meet the standards of due process, or according to Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) The office shall deliver all collected bail
amounts, less the cost of collection to the court
which issued the warrant of arrest, in accordance
with the provisions of Subsection 77-7-19(3). The
office may reissue administrative writs of garnishment or execution until the full bail amount referred
to it for collection has been collected.
19M

Chapter 15d, Medical Benefits Recovery
A

c

t

•

"

•

•

'

•

•

••

" ' *

':••'••

55-15d-l through 55-15d-17. Repealed.

1981

Chapter 15e. Administrative
Determination of Overpayments ;

;,

55-15e-l. Citation of chapter.
55-15e-2. Definitions.
55-15c-3. Obligor presumed to have received notice of
department's rights - Adoption of regulations by
department - Powers of department to administer I ' <
chapter - Recovery of attorney's fees, costs and : r
interests.
55-15e-4. Determination of overpayment and
fraudulently obtained benefits - Notice of determination
- Service of notice - Default order.
55-15e-5. Hearing - Location and time - Continuances r
- Official record - Findings required - Default Service of findings Upon parties.
''
55-15e-6. Judicial review - Procedure.
55-15e-7. Order to show cause why previously entered
order should not be prospectively modified.
55-15e-8. Abstract of final order docketed in office of,
circuit court clerk and In Judgment docket of district.
court - Lien upon real property of obligor - Order
','',',
having same effect as money judgment.
55-15e-9. Property subject to execution or Hen Restriction on transfer or conveyance • Release of excess
amount above liability to obligor.
,' :
55-15e-10. Schedule of payments to be paid upon
'
liability • Establishment - Cancellation.
i
55-15e-ll. Extension of time in proceedings. •
55-15e-12. Statute of limitations.
vj
55-15e-13. Legal representation at hearings and
proceedings.
'
•••:

"

"'

'

" '

- i

'>•

4

» •

•:

'

'•'

'

'..

'

;

:

'

55-15e-l. Citation of chapter.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as
the "Administrative Determination of Overpayments
Act/
'
1984
55-15e-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
:•!'.''
. (1) "Court order" means a judgment or order of a
small claims, circuit, or district court of the state, or
of a court of comparable jurisdiction in another
state, ordering repayment of an overpayment.
(2) "Department" means the Department of Social
Services.
(3) "Obligor" means an individual who is liable to
the State under Subsections 55-15a-24(l) and (2)
and applicable federal statutes and regulations, or
against whom an order determining overpayment
has been issued by the department or an administrative hearing examiner.
(4) "Overpayment" means a state or federally
funded entitlement benefit, or assistance, paid to or
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55-15e-6.

Public Welfare

in behalf of an individual who is either ineligible to
receive the benefit or assistance or ineligible to
receive it at the level paid to the individual, whether
or not the individual fraudulently obtained the
payment.
. ...
• l9M
55-15e-3, Obligor presumed to have received
notice of department's rights - Adoption of
regulations by department - Powers of
department to administer chapter - Recovery of
attorney's fees, costs and interests.
(1) An obligor is presumed to have received notice
of the rights of the department under this chapter
upon engaging, in the state of Utah, in any of the
acts described in Subsections 55-15a-24(l) and
(2).
(2) The department may adopt, amend, and
enforce such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out this chapter including, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, regulations prescribing
rules for narrowing issues and simplifying methods
of proof at hearings. The regulations shall include
procedures for serving the notices required under
this chapter.
(3) For the purposes of this chapter, the department through its director or his authorized representative may administer oaths, certify official acts,
issue subpoenas, and compel witnesses and the
production of business records, documents, and
evidence.
(4)(a) Except when an overpayment results from
administrative error, the department may recover
from the obligor reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred in pursuing administrative remedies under
this chapter, and interest not to exceed 1% per
month on an amount determined to be due by
administrative default order or the order of an
administrative hearing examiner. The interest shall
begin to accrue from the date the order is issued.
(b) A notice or statement of amount due under
this chapter issued prior to entry of an administrative default order or order of an administrative
hearing examiner shall advise the obligor of the
department's right to assess attorney fees, costs,
and interest, and shall disclose the amount of interest to be assessed.
1984
55-15e-4. Determination of overpayment and
fraudulently obtained benefits - Notice of
determination - Service of notice - Default
order.
(1) If the obligor is not subject to a current court
order, the department may determine administratively whether an overpayment was made and whether
benefits were fraudulently obtained. It may then
issue a notice of determination of overpayment and
demand payment in full. If the obligor fails to pay
the overpayment or to deliver a written response to
the department within 30 days of service of notice
on the obligor, the department may enter default
against the obligor by administrative order.
(2) The notice of determination shall include the
following:
(a) the amount of the overpayment;
(b) a demand for payment of the amount of the
overpayment within 30 days or, in the alternative,
for delivery to the department of a written response
to the demand within 30 days of service of the
notice, asserting claimed defenses to the liability;
(c) the period during which the liability accrued;
(d) the basis of the liability;
(e) a statement that the obligor has a right to a
hearing and that he may obtain the hearing by
request in his written response; and
Code • Co
Provo, Utah

••',

>;.••;!.

(f) a statement that if full payment or a written
response is not received by the department within 30
days from the date of service of the notice on the
obligor, the department will issue a default order
fixing the amount of the liability as reflected by the
records and other evidence in the possession of the
department and that collection action may be taken
against the obligor, including, but not limited to,
attachment, garnishment, and wage assignment.
(3) Service of the notice of determination shall be
made under department regulations which meet the
standards of due process or under Rule 4, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. .
1984
55-15e-5. Hearing - Location and time *
Continuances - Official record - Findings
required - Default - Service of findings upon
, parties.
(l)(a) Any person adversely affected by an action
of the department under this chapter is entitled to a
hearing. T o obtain a hearing the person must file a
request in writing with the director within 30 days
after the person receives notification of the adverse
action. The hearing shall be held in the person's
county of residence or other place convenient to the
person and shall be conducted by an administrative
hearing examiner. The hearing shall be held within
30 days after the request is filed!
(b) The department may promulgate regulations
establishing criteria for the granting of continuances
of hearing dates.
(2) The department shall make and retain an
official record of the hearing.
(3) The administrative hearing examiner shall
make specific findings of fact based on evidence and
testimony presented at the hearing. The findings of
fact shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
<
(a) the actions in which the obligor engaged,
resulting in the liability;
(b) the amount of the liability;
(c) the time period during which the liability
accrued;
(d) the facts upon which the liability is based;
and
i
(e) the applicable state and federal statutes and
regulations.
,
(4) If the obligor fails to appear at the time and
place set for the hearing, upon proof of proper
notice to the obligor, the administrative hearing
examiner shall enter his findings of fact and order
by default.
(5) Within 30 days after the last day of the
hearing or the entry of default, the administrative
hearing examiner shall have a copy of the findings
of fact and final order served upon the parties.
1984
55-15e-6. Judicial review - Procedure.
(1) When findings and an order have been entered
by the administrative hearing examiner subsequent
to a hearing, judicial review of those findings and
order may be secured by any person adversely affected thereby by filing a petition in the district court
of the county where the hearing was conducted
within 30 days after receipt of notice of the order.
(a) At the time of filing the petition, a copy shall
be served upon all parties to the hearing, and shall
state the grounds upon which review is sought.
(b) Service may be made by mailing to the parties
or to the legal counsel who represented the parties at
the hearing. The petitioner and the department shall
in all cases be considered the original parties to the
judicial review.
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(c) The department shall certify and file with the
court all documents and papers relevant to the
review, a transcript o f all testimony taken during the
hearing, and the administrative hearing examiner's
,;
findings of fact and order.
'
(2) Within 30 days after the filing o f the petition,
the petitioner shall file and serve a memorandum o f
points and authorities, supporting in detail the
grounds set forth in the petition for judicial review.
If the petitioner relies upon the transcript, he shall
cite in the memorandum the pages and the lines in
the transcript upon which he relies.
•
(3) Within 30 days after the filing of the memorandum by the petitioner, the department shall file
and serve a memorandum of answering points and
authorities. If the department relies upon the transcript, the department shall cite in its memorandum
the pages and the lines in the transcript upon which
it relies.
(4) Upon expiration of the time permitted for
filing of the memorandum o f answering points and
authorities or upon the filing o f the memorandum,
either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter for decision, which shall be made without
oral argument unless oral argument is requested by'
either party or the court.
(5) For good cause shown the district court may
grant a trial de novo.
1984
55-15e-7. Order to show cause why previously
entered order should not be prospectively
modified.
In addition t o , or in lieu of, any other action
provided for under this chapter, and in the absence
of an intervening court order, the department, upon
petition by the obligor or on its own initiative, may,
based on a material change in circumstances and
good cause shown, issue an order requiring an
obligor to show cause why the order previously
entered should not be prospectively modified. The
order to show cause and a copy of any affidavit
upon which it is based shall be served on the obligor»
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing
on the order to show cause shall be provided in the
same manner, and determinations shall be based on
the same considerations, as provided under Section
55-15e-5.
19M
55-15e-8. Abstract of final order docketed in
' office of circuit court clerk and in judgment
docket of district court - Lien upon real
property of obligor • Order having same effect
as money judgment.
(l)(a) A n abstract o f a final order may be docketed in the office o f the clerk o f any circuit court
and in the judgment docket of any district court of
any county in the state. The time o f the receipt of
the abstract must be noted by the clerk o n the abstract and entered in the docket.
(b) When the abstract is docketed in the district
court, the award in the order shall, from the time.of
docketing, constitute a lien upon the real property
of the obligor situated in that county, for a period
of eight years from the date of the order unless
previously satisfied.
(c) The final order fixing the liability of the
obligor shall have the same effect as any other
money judgment entered in a circuit court or a district court.
•
'
1984
55*15e-9. Property subject to execution or lien Restriction on transfer or conveyance - Release
of excess amount above liability to obligor.
(1) After receiving notice of the docketing of an

884

abstract under thi« chapter, a person in possession
of any property which may be subject to execution
or lien may not pay over, release, sell, transfer,
encumber, or convey that property to any person
other than the department, unless the person in
possession first receives a release or waiver from the
department, or a court order stating that the liability
does not exist or has been satisfied.
;
; *
(2) If a person has in his possession earnings,
deposits, accounts, or balances owing to the obligor
in excess of $100 over the amount of the liability
claimed by the department, the person in possession
may, without liability under this chapter, release the
excess to the obligor.
1984
55-15e-10. Schedule of payments to be paid upon
liability - Establishment - Cancellation.
The department may, consistent with the income,
earning capacity, and resources o f the obligor, set or
reset at any time the level and schedule o f payments
to be paid upon the liability and may cancel the
schedule of payments at any time and demand
immediate payment in full.
;
*: 1994
55-15e-ll. Extension of time in proceedings.
If the administrative hearing examiner determines
that good cause exists for an extension of time in
relation to any proceedings under this chapter, the
!
examiner shall grant the extension.
» 19M
t
55-15e-12. Statute of limitations.
N o action for the enforcement of an order o f
liability or lien issued under this chapter may b e
maintained unless it is commenced within eight years
after the date of the order.
1984
55-15e-13. Legal representation at hearings and
proceedings.
(1) A party may be represented by legal counsel at
any hearing held under this chapter.
(2) At the request of the department it is the duty
of, the attorney general or the county attorney to
represent the department in any proceeding commenced under this chapter.
" , 1984

Chapter 16. Reporting Physical Abuse of
Minors
^t
.
55-16-1 through 55-16-7. Repealed.

1978

Chapter 17. Job Training Coordination
Act
55-17-1 through 55-17-5. Repealed.
55-17-6. Short title.
55-17-7. Definitions.
55-17-8. Creation of Job Training Coordinating Council.
55-17-9. Membership of council.
55-17-10. Creation of Office of Job Training for
Economic Development.
55-17-11. Duties of Job Training Coordinating Council
55-17-12. Limitations on council.
v
55-17-13. Duties of private industry council.

55-17-1 through 55-17-5. Repealed.
j , 1985
55-17-6. Short title.
This act is known as the "Job Training Coordination Act."
••••..« 1985
55-17-7. Definitions.
As used in Sections 55-17-6 through 55-1713:

'•

•'•

•. j

(1) "Job Training Partnership Act": means the
federal law enacted in 29 U . S . C . Section 1501, et
seq.
'•
i ' '. !•
(2) "Job Training Coordinating Council" or
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EFFECTIVE N U V E f b E k 3 0 , 19 34 YOUR F I N A N C I A L AND-Ck K t U l C A L
ASSISTANCE H I L L BE CLOSED BECAUSE, THE VALUE OF VQUF A S S L T S I S GREATER
THAN OUR POL ICY ALLOWS, ( V O L . 1 1 , SEC. * 0 2 - l )
c F F E C l l V E NOVLHSTR 3 0 , 19B«t YOUR FOOD STAht- ASSISTANCE K I L L cE
b l SCOM 1NUED EECAUSE YOU HAVE F A I L E D TO PROVIDE S P E C I F I C I N F O K K A T I O N
i-.EOUcSTtO TO L-LTER.MNE YOUR E L I G I B I L I T Y .
ALTHOUGH YJUk CASE I S CLOSED. YOU KAY BE E L I G I t - L L F o \ ANOTHER TYPE
LiF A S S I S T A N C E .
I F YOU ARE INTERESTED IN APPLYING FOR ANOTHER PROGRAM,
P l t A S e CONTACT YuUR D I S T R I C T O F F I C E .
THIS ACTION I S EASED ON IriE LATEST
i N F O R K A T l u N KL HAVE ABOUT YOUR CASE.
YJU ^ t
CONTACT YOuk D I S T R I C T OFFICE FOR A C I T A T I O N OF THE
K C & U L A T I L - N UPON R-hKH THIS ACTION IS EASED.
THE D I S T R I C T OFFICE R I L L
ALSu i * P O V YUO UF THE ELEMENTS USED If. ANY BUDGET COMPUTATION.
^O'NTACT
THE D I S T R I C T OFFICE AT I O ' J O SOUTH tOC REST
LR1GHAM C I I Y , u l A r i
tn302 7 2 3 ~ r b S i .
F A M L Y PLANNING SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE. IF YOU D E S I K E ThEr..
CONTACT
YOCv J i S T r , l C T D I V I S I O N uF F A H l L Y SERVICES.
INFORMATION RtGA«.DING YUUR
RlGriTb TO A FAIR HEARING I S AVAILABLE ON ThE BACK uF T h l S N O T I C E .
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Scott W Matr.eson, Governor Stale of Utah
Norman G Angus Executive Director

Social Services

November 19, 1984

Betty Ann Vhitaker
240 N. 1st W.
Brigham City, Utah
RE:

84302

Overpayment
(acct #): 60180482R-1

Dear Ms. Whitaker:
The Coramunity Operations District Office has reported to this office
that while
on public
assistance you incurred the following
overpayment(s):
Financial $
Medical $
Food Stamp $1,116.00
during June 1983 through July 1984 due to an intentional program
violation.
Please pay this amount to the Office of Recovery Services or contact
me within ten (10) days from the date of this letter to discuss this
matter.
If you fail to contact me within the requested period of time, policy
requires this agency to take a different and stronger legal course of
action.
Our office, however, wants to avoid such activity and
appreciates your cooperation.
Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,

Terry SCTIOW
Investigator
Telephone 627-0545
TS/pr
T 60
Office of Recovery Services
JDhr= AtDSt: D.ecto-
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S c o t t M M a t h e s o n . G o v e r n o r State o? U t a h
Norman G Angus. Executive Director

Social Services

December 6, 1984

Betty Ann Whitaker
240 North 1st West
Brigham City, UT 84302
RE:

Overpayment
Account Number:

60180482R-2

Dear Ms. Whitaker:
The Community Operations District Office has reported to this office
that while
on public assistance you
incurred the following
overpayment(s):
Financial: $80.00
Medical: $
0.00
Food Stamp: $0.00
during May
violation.

through

October

1984

due

to

an

intentional

program

Please pay this amount to the Office of Recovery Services or contact
me within ten (10) days from the date of this letter to discuss this
matter.
If you fail to contact roe within the requested period of time, policy
requires this agency to take a different and stronger legal course of
action.
Our office, however, wants to avoid such activity and
appreciates your cooperation.
Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,

T. Schow
Investigator
Telephone: 627-0545
T60
Office of Recovery Services
John P A t o o t ! .D.rector
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Social Services

Scoll M Matheson Governor State of Utah
Norman G Angus. Executive Director

December 12, 1984

Betty Ann Whitalcer
240 N. 1st West *
Brigham City, UT 84302
RE:

Acct. #60180482R-1

- Balance $1,196.00

Dear Ms. Whitaker:
You have failed to respond to our letter sent to you ten days ago.
Payment or arrangements must be made within ten (10) days to: STATE OF
UTAH, OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, or legal action may follow without
further notice to you.
STATE OF UTAH vs. Betty Ann Whi taker may add court costs, interest, wage
garnishments, State income Tax refund attachments, plus vehicles,
properties, etc.
Please respond promptly.
Sincerely,

Terry Schow
Investigator
Telephone: 627-0545

T60
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Ogden Office. 533 26tn Street. Suite 201
OQden Utan 84401 -2416
801-627-0540

Office of Recovery Services
JohnP Abbott. Director

An Equal Opportunity Employer

24 30 34

Utah-DSS-APA
Form, 490 6/83

HEARING RIGHTS
U N D E R W H A T C I R C U M S T A N C E S : You have the right to an agency c o n f e r e n c e - a meeting w i t h your local office
w o r k e r and his supervisor—to d i s c u s s any disagreements you have.
You also have the right to a hearing before an impartial Hearing Examiner if the District Office has taken any of the
following actions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Failed to act upon your application w i t h i n 3 0 days, or denied your application, OR
R e d u c e d , held, d i s c o n t i n u e d , or c h a n g e d the form of your assistance, OR
Required you to participate in a Work Experience and Training program, OR
In any other way acted against your interests, in violation of the law.

W H E N T O R E Q U E S T A H E A R I N G : If you are receiving assistance, a n d you mail or personally deliver a written hearing
request w i t h i n 15 days of the mailing of the N o t i c e of D e c i s i o n with w h i c h you disagree, usually your assistance will be
c o n t i n u e d or reinstated as before, until there is a d e c i s i o n as a result of the hearing.
There are some e x c e p t i o n s to the c o n t i n u a n c e of benefits and the 15 day time limit for hearing requests. Contact the
District Office for policy c o n c e r n i n g your specific case.
If you request a hearing because you were notified that your a s s i s t a n c e w o u l d be r e d u c e d or terminated, and your
a s s i s t a n c e w a s c o n t i n u e d or reinstated p e n d i n g a hearing d e c i s i o n , aii or part of the a s s i s t a n c e issued due to your request
may be an overpayment and may be recovered if the hearing d e c i s i o n upholds the agency action, and you are
u n s u c c e s s f u l in your further appeal of that d e c i s i o n .
D E A D L I N E : A hearing will not be granted unless you request it w i t h i n 9 0 days of the action w i t h w h i c h you disagree. In
addition, if you receive food stamps, you may request a fair hearing w i t h i n your certification period on your c u r r e n t level of
benefits.
L E G A L A S S I S T A N C E A N D O T H E R H E L P : In d e c i d i n g whether to file a request for an agency conference or a hearing,
you may contact a local legal services office or other c o m m u n i t y agency. You may be entitled to free legal assistance.
Your worker at your local District Community Operations Office can tell you where to obtain free legal assistance. You
have the right to bring your attorney and any other person to the agency c o n f e r e n c e or hearing. You may bring a statement
from a doctor of your c h o i c e if your problem is about medical assistance. You or your representative may review all
materials in your case file. The only exception is for confidential information.
H O W T O R E Q U E S T A H E A R I N G A N D / O R A C O N F E R E N C E : If you want a hearing a n d / o r an agency conference, you
may complete the bottom half of this form and mail it to:
Personally deliver the form to your
local District Office

OR

Department of Social Services
Hearing Examiner
P.O. Box 2500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2500

REQUEST FOR AGENCY CONFERENCE OR A HEARING
•

•
•

I want an agency conference.

EB I want a hearing.

I want my benefits continued.
I do NOT want my benefits continued.

I am making this request because .
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Address:
Soc. Sec. No.:
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Attorney or representative:
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Date:
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UTAH-DSS-ORS-BCS
FORM 743,2 - 1/85
STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

.... %

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff

NOTICE OF INFORMAL
CONFERENCE

\

vs.
CASE NO. 60180482R-1,2,3
Betty Ann Whitaker
Defendant
SSN: 502-16-7665
To: Betty Ann Whitaker
2A0 North 100 West
Brigham City, UT 84302
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
You have been scheduled to attend an informal conference on August 27,
1985, at the hour of 11:00 a.m. at 533 - 26th Street, Suite 201, Ogden,, Utah
84401 before an Investigator of the Office of Recovery Services.
The purpose of this conference, in lieu of a formal hearing, is to give
you an opportunity to examine the State*s evidence regarding your overpayment
obligation and an opportunity to provide your own evidence relating to this
matter.
Please fill out the enclosed Income/Asset Affidavit, and bring this and
any supporting information to the conference. If you cannot make this
appointment, please telephone to make arrangements for another time or return
this form with the rescheduling information below completed, to the Office of
Recovery Services, 533 - 26th Street, Suite 201, Ogden, Utah 84401.

I would prefer to reschedule
my informal conference on
f

at

198

T.A Sctiow, Investigator
533 26tti Street, Suite 201
Ogden, Utah 84401
627-0540

AM/PM

I can be reached a t , telephone:

T60/TS
0212C
Appendix "K"
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UTAH-DSS-ORS-BCS
FORM 743.1 - 3/85

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
r

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff
•

vs.
Betty Ann Uhitaker
Defendant
SSN: 502-16-7665

)
1
)
1
)
)
)

NOTICE OF OVERPAYMENT
DETERMINATION
CASE NO. 60180482R-1,2,3

To: Betty Ann Whitaker
240 North 100 West
Brigham City, UT 84302
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
1,

During the time period(s) of June 1, 1983 through October 31, 1984

you received $1377,88 in public assistance to which you were not entitled as
follows:

Program

Time Period

Amount

Financial
Food Stamps
Medical

05-01-84 to 10-31-84
06-01-83 to 07-31-84
05-01-84 to 10-31-84

80.00
1166.00
131.88

Total Obligation
Less Total Payments
Total Debt

2.
3.

1377.88
0.00
1377.88

You were not entitled to the above because excess resources.

The State of Utah, pursuant to UCA 55-15a-24, is entitled to recover all

overpayments of public assistance.

4.

Within 30 days of this notice you are required to do one of the

following:
a.

Pay the entire amount of the overpayment in full to the Office of

Recovery Services, P. 0. Box 15400, SLC, Utah

84115

Attn:

Team #60/TS.
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, b.

Attend an informal conference with a representative of the Office

of Recpvery^ Services , at which you may reach an agreement as to the cause and
the

amount

of the overpayment, agree to a monthly repayment

amount and

stipulate to an order and judgment to repay that amount to the Office of
Recovery Services*
c.

Request a formal hearing

on

the enclosed Legal Rights/Written

Answer form, if you cannot reach an agreement with this office on the amount
of your obligation and/or a repayment amount and/or stipulate to an order and
judgment for the same*
5.

If you fail to do one of the above, a default judgment, for the

entire amount (as listed in #1 above) will be entered against you and docketed
with the appropriate court.

The State of Utah will then proceed to collect

the judgment and 12 percent per annum interest thereon by any legal means
available

including but not limited

assignment.

to, attachment, garnishment and wage

In addition, an Administrative Disqualification Hearing will be

held regarding the Food Stamp portion of your overpayment obligation, if one
exists*

6.

This action is being brought pursuant to the provisions of Section

55-15e-l et. seq., as amended, 1953*

7.

HAVING RECEIVED THIS NOTICE, YOU NOW HAVE THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO

NOTIFY THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES OF ANY CHANGE IN YOUR ADDRESS OR
EMPLOYMENT*
Dated July 2, 1985.

T. SchdW, Investigator
T60/TS.
0212C

Appendix "K"
age 3 of 6

p

I p f i i i N(>

WRITT1N ANtWEft
•
Name: _ .
(Please print full name as It appears of the enclosed Notice)

*
Phone:

Address
Social Security No.: _

Date of Birth:

Chlld(ren)'e Names: _
I do not want an Informal conference. I request a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. I will be represented/accompanied by:
Name:._

Phone:

Address:
This person:

D

is an attorney

D

is not an attorney.

I am making this request because: (check)
D

I do not agree with the amount of the total debt claimed by the Office of
Recovery Services.

D

I do not agree with the amount of the monthly ongoing obligation, and no
court order is in effect covering the same.

EXPLANATION:

Signature:

Date:
* * * CONFIDENTIAL * * *
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•TATI OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
LEGAL RIGHTS/WRITTEN ANSWER

CONFERENCE
You have the option to attend an Informal conference with a representative of the Office of
Recovery Services, the purpose of such a conference is to afford you an opportunity to examine the State's evidence of your debt, and an opportunity to provide your own evidence relating
to the same An informal conference will also provide an opportunity to discuss a fair monthly
ongoing obligation, if such has not already been established by a court.

HEARING
If you cannot reach an agreement in an informal conference, or do not desire an informal conference with an agency representative, under the U.S. Constitution and Utah law (Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-45P-6), you have the right to a formal hearing before an independent Administrative Law Judge.
Focus of Inquiry at the Hearing
The Administrative Law Judge may determine the total amount of your debt and ongoing
obligation, if such has not already been established by a court. He may also determine whether
you have failed to make payments past due in the amount the Office of Recovery Services
claims. However, the Administrative Law Judge cannot modify the amount of support due and
owing under a valid Court Order of this or any other State, and cannot determine issues of
paternity.
The hearing will be held in the county of your residence or other place of convenience to you
within thirty (30) days after the request has been filed. Written findings will be made within
twenty (20) days of the date of the hearing which determines your liability and responsibility.
Your Right to Answer and Question
You are entitled to remain completely silent so that nothing you say can be used against you
(i.e.. you can force the Office of Recovery Services to make out its case against you). You can
rebut any unfavorable evidence they present against you and can present any written or oral
evidence of your own.
I f you desire a heading complete and sign the WRITTEN ANSWER or. the reverse side of this
form and mail it to Office of Recovery Services, P.O Box 15400, Salt Lake City Utah
64115-0400 You will be sent notice of the time and place of the hearing.
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INCOME/ASSET AFFIDAVIT
Complete this form except for the signature by filling in every item. For each item that does not apply wirte the
letters "NA". Bring this form to the scheduled appointment at the local office address where it may be signed in the
presence of a Notary Public. Those items marked with a asterisk (•) must be verified by bringing in copies of bills,
receipts, check stubs, etc.
Your Name .

Social Security Number.

Date of Birth .

Phone Number

Street.
Zip.

City .

State .

Length of Time at Address .

Buying .

Closest Relative's Name .

Address .

Previous Employer

Previous Gross Income-Hourly .

Present Employer

Dates Emp.

Addi ess

Phone Number.

'Gross Income-Hourly .

Monthly

Renting From .
Ph. No.
. Monthly .

Present Wife's Name _

Wile's Employer

Dates Emp. _

Address

'Gross Income-Hourly

Monthly .

•Other Income
Bank

Length of Time at Bank .

Credit Union .

Branch

Checking

Account No. .

Balance .

Savings

Account No. .

Balance .

Stocks/Bonds .
Present Wife (Yes or No)

If yes, number of stepchildren in your household:

Number ol your children living in your household
Dale
Dobl
Inclined

* Real Estate
(House, Rental
Property, etc.)

Mo
Pyml.
Amount

Balance
Owed

Estimated
Current
Value

Paid To:

* Vehicles/Cars,
Trucks, Boats,
Motorcycles,
Snowmobiles, etc.
* Other Debts

'Rental $

/Mo.

. /Mo.

Utilities $ .

Telephone $_

./Mo.

General Comments:

I corlily tluit Ihu above is liuo to the bust ol my knowledge and bo lie I

DEFANDANT
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

DATE
day ol

, 19_

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
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Not served with a Summons served for the purpose of
advising the defendant of
the information upon which
attachment/garnishment is
issued

Robert D. Barclay
Deputy Weber County Attorney
533 - 26th Street, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2354

IN THE SEO0ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (XXJRT OF WBBER OODOTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services, Office of
Recovery Services,
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO.

BETTY A. WHITAKER,

9311?

Defendant.
-—\

^

Plaintiff complains and alleges for cause of action against the

x

}
/defendant
as follows:
W v Mr
J
The defendant is
a resident
Weber County, Utah, presently
\V M\ ;€ /
CLAIM
AGAINSTofDEFENEftNT
v^p \^living at^04 - 22nd Street, Ogden, Utah.
2. During the period June, 1983, through October, 1984, the
defendant received public assistance benefits from the plaintiff, but was not
entitled to receive a portion thereof and was accordingly overpaid, to wit:
Assistance
Amt Received
A. Financial
$ 80.00
B. Food Stamps 1,166.00
C. Medical
TOTALS

131.88
$1,407.88

Amt Eligible to Receive Overpayment
$
.00
$ 80.00
.00
1,166.00
$

.00
.00

131.88
$1,407.88

3. Said overpayment occurred because the defendant failed to report
correct and complete information to the plaintiff, which information would
have directly affected the defendant's eligibility for the benefits, namely:

Appendix " L "
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Verified Complaint
Betty A. Whitaker, Civil No.

the defendant had an approximate $20f000.00 equity in a hone which should have
been reported and counted as a financial resource in determining her
eligibility.

Defendants actions constituted fraudulent misrepresentation

upon which the plaintiff relied in issuing the said benefits to the defendant.
4. The defendant has a duty to repay the overpaymentf but has
refused to do so. Defendant has requested a fair hearing before the District
II (A) OCO-APA Office and the hearing officer has taken the matter under
advisement.

If the hearing officer rules against the dfifgnrknt, i't 1jg

doubtful that she will pay the debt and direct action against her would be
required.

If the hearing officer rules against the State, the State has a

right to obtain a trial de novo before the District Courtjgurgua.nt **> nt-^h "
Code Annotated 55-15a-25, which would require direct action against the
defendant.

This complaint is filed for either purpose.

5. The costs, interest and attorney1 s fees presently approximate
$1,092.12.

REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL REMEDY
6.

Pursuant to Rule 64C(o), and as referenced thereto in Rule

64D(a) (i), Dtah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may conroence action upon an
obligation before it is due and have an attachment or garnishment issued
against the property of the debtor.
7.

In Civil Case No. 16570, in the First District Court, Box Elder
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Betty Whitaker
Verified Complaint

County, the court has recently ordered that the defendant's equity in the home
be paid to her. The plaintiff learned on October 15, 198^ that the
defendant's former husband will accordingly pay to the First District Court
Q e r k the approximate sun of $17,574.39 on October 16, 1985.
8. The defendant's former attorney, Pandine Salerno, has an
atttorney's lien filed against said proceeds in the approximate amount of
$ 618.00. After paying the attorney's lien, there are sufficient funds
available to pay the $ 1,407.88 which is due to the plaintiff, plus costs,
interest and a reasonable attorney's fee.
9.

To the knowledge of the plaintiff, the defendant has no legal

set-offs; attachment or garnishment is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud
any creditor of the defendant;

the payment of the plaintiff's claim has not

been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or personal property in this
state; the defendant is about to dispose of said proceeds with the intent to
defraud the plaintiff; and as stated in paragraph 3 above, the defendant
fraudulently incurred the obligation respecting which this action is brought.
10.

The First District Court Q e r k will forward said proceeds to the

defendant and/or the former attorney immediately upon receipt*
11. TO the plaintiff's knowledge the defendant has not filed a
declaration of homestead with respect to the real property or said proceeds.
Further, said proceeds are not earnings for personal services of the defendant
and are not otherwise exempt from attachment or garnishment under Title 78,
Chapter 23 of Utah Code Annotated.
Appendix "L"
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Verified Complaint

12.

The plaintiff is not required to file a bond or undertaking.

13.

Unless a prejudgment order of attachment or garnishment is

issued without notice the defendant will receive the proceeds and dispose of
them.

Ihe plaintiff knows of no other assets from which the claim can be

satisfied.

Accordingly, the plaintifff will suffer irreparable injuryf loss

and damage in that the defendant will not again have a fund from which the
entire debt due to the plaintiff can be paid.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays and moves for judgment and order of the
court as follows:
1.

Judgment against the defendant in the amount of $1,407.88, plus

costs and interest, as may be appropriate pending the decision of the fair
hearing officer.
2.

Attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 15-15a-24(7).

3. An order of pre-judgment attachment or garnishment directing the
First District Court Clerk to retain $2,500.00 from any and all funds received
on behalf of the defendant (but to pay the balance thereof to the defendant's
attorney pursuant to the attorney's lien and to the defendant).
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4.

For the court to set a date and time certain for hearing on the

order of pre-judgment attachment or garnishment at the earliest reasonable
time*
DATED this

/£

day of October, 1985.

ELAINE GUNNERSCN
Supervisor, r-60
Office of Recovery Services
///

r

) /

Jju^f% ^IUAJL^
ROBERT D. BARCLAY
/ )
Deputy Weber County Attorney

VERIFICATION
STATE OF OTAH )
COUNTY OF WEBER ) SS.
Elaine Gunnerson, being f i r s t duly sworn, states on oath that she has
read the foregoing Canplaint and to the best of her knowledge and belief the
allegations and f a c t s stated therein are true and correct.
DATED t h i s /£
day of October, 1985.

iLAINE GUNNERSCtf
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME t h i s A ' d a y of October, 1985.

^VT^ny

$t^*dL—-

NOTARY PUBLtC£/tX3DEN, UTAH

My Conmission Expires::

, , /

C\)l
l\)ilM

„

M
tf^j^L
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STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF
NOTICE OF OVERPAYMENT
DETERMINATION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No:

BETTY ANN WHITAKER,

60180482R-1,2,3

Defendant.
TO:

Betty A. Whitaker
504 22nd Street
Ogden, UT 84401

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
That

the

above-named

plaintiff

hereby

dismisses

the

Notice

of

Overpayment Determination, dated July 2, 1985.
The claim raised in said Notice shall be adjudicated in the judicial
action, State of Utah v. Betty A. Whitaker, Weber County Case Niimber 93725.
Additionally, proceedings are pending regarding said claim pursuant to your
request for a hearing on December 26, 1984 (elected under section ^5-15a-25,
U.C.A.).
Dated:

November 5, 1985

T*. Sohow, Investigator
V

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Dismissal of Notice of Overpayment Determination to the
defendant, Betty Ann Whitaker at 504 22nd Street, Ogden, UT 84401 this
T ^ ^
day of November, 1985.

^lljO^U i , >/

IAJA.

xhi/aK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Social Services,
i

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

BETTY A. WHITAKER,

'
1
1

Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Case No.

93725

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is in essence based upon
whether or not the plaintiff can maintain a judicial action while
there is a pending administrative action.
the two actions will adjudicate similar
trative action will
administrative

not result

The plaintiff claims
issues.

in a money

The adminis-

judgment.

The

action was a hearing requested by defendant to

establish eligibility and is not related to a collection action.
I can determine

no statutory prohibition against the

State commencing this action, and the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative

remedies

does

not

appear

to be applicable.

Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
DATED this ol frdav of Decemberf 1985.
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Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Case No. 93725

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
1985f

day of Decemberf

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motion

to Dismiss was served upon the following:
Robert D. Barclay
Attorney for Plaintiff
533 26th Street/ Suite 200
Ogdenf Utah 84401
Curtis L, Child
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES/ INC.
Attorney for Defendant
385 24th Street/ Suite 522
Ogdenf Utah 84401

CARR/ Secretary
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Utah-DSS-APA
Volume II
400

Asset Standards
Only assets acutally available to an individual shall be considered
in establishing eligiblity. All possible assets must be explored.

402

1.

When an applicant or recipient owns property and has the legal
right to sell it without interference, the property is available
and we will count it in determining eligibility.

2.

Any assets controlled by a legal guardian are available for the
support of the ward and should be considered available to the
ward in determining eligibility.

3.

Life estates are not considered available assets.

Asset Limits
The equity value of all non-exempt real and personal property cannot
exceed $1,000, regardless of the size of the household. !
402.1

Determining the Value of Assets
Assets shall be reasonably evaluated according to their
equity value.

404

1.

Equity value means fair market value less any
obligations or debts still owing an the asset.

2.

Fair Market value means the price a particular item
will sell for on the open market in the geographic
area involved.

Personal Property
Personal property includes liquid assets and items other than real
property, such as, but not limited to the following examples.

df

1.

Liquid assets: Those properties in the form of cash or
convertible to cash, including savings accounts, checking
accounts, stocks (including water stock),, bonds, mutual fund
shares, promissary notes, mortages, loan or cash value of
insurance policies, trust funds, agreements in escrow, income
tax refunds and similar properties.

2.

All motor vehicles, including automobiles, trucks, motorbikes,
motorcycles, snowmobiles, etc.

3.

Boats, campers, trailers.

Life Estate: There is no legal ownership of the property but the
person retains the right to use the property until the time of death.
B-86-04-APA
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§ 233.20

Office of Family Assistance, HHS

(J) Identify which of the above situ(C) If agency policies provide for allocation of the individual's income as ations are included;
(2) In the case of situations involvnecessary for the support of his dependents, such allocation shall not ing the increase in the need standard
exceed the total amount of their need and changes in the amount that have
as determined by the State's need been paid to the family, specify the
types of circumstances which will be
standard;
(D) Income after application of dis- included;
(3) In the case of situations involvregards, except as provided in paragraph (a)(3)(xiii) of this section, and ing the unavailability of the lump sum
resources available for current use income, include a definition of unshall be considered. To the extent not availability, and specify what reasons
inconsistent with any other provision will be considered beyond the control
of this chapter, income and resources of the family;
are considered available both when ac(4) In the case of situations involvtually available and when the appli- ing the payment of medical expenses,
cant or recipient has a legal interest in specify the types of medical expenses
a liquidated sum and has the legal the State will allow to be offset
ability to make such sum available for against the lump sum income.
support and maintenance.
For purposes of this paragraph (a)(3):
(E) Income and resources will be rea- Automobile means a passenger car or
sonably evaluated. Resources will be other motor vehicle used to provide
evaluated according to their equity transportation of persons or goods. (In
AFDC, in appropriate geographic
value.
(P) When the AFDC assistance areas, one alternate primary mode of
unit's income, after applying applica- transportation may be substituted for
ble disregards, exceeds the State need the automobile); Equity value means
standard for the family because of re- fair market value minus encumbrances
ceipt of nonrecurring earned or un- (legal debts); Fair market value means
earned lump sum income, the family the price an item of a particular make,
will be ineligible for aid for the full model, size, material or condition will
number of months derived by dividing sell for on the open market in the geothe sum of the lump sum income and graphic area involved (If a motor vehiother income by the monthly need cle is especially equipped with apparastandard for a family of that size. Any tus for the handicapped, the apparaincome remaining from this calcula- tus shall not increase the value of the
tion is income in the first month fol- vehicle); liquid assets are those proplowing the period of ineligibility. The erties in the form of cash or other fiperiod of ineligibility shall begin with nancial instruments which are conthe month of receipt of the nonrecur- vertible to cash and include savings acring income or, at State option, as late counts, checking accounts, stocks,
as the corresponding payment month. bonds, mutual fund shares, promissory
For purposes of applying the lump notes, mortgages, cash value of insursum provision, family includes all per- ance policies, and similar properties;
sons whose needs are taken into ac- Need standard means the money value
count in determining eligibility and assigned by the State to the basic and
the amount of the assistance payment. special needs it recognizes as essential
A State may shorten the remaining for applicants and recipients; Payment
period of ineligibility when: the stand- standard means the amount from
ard of need increases and the amount which non-exempt income is subtractthe family would have received also ed;
changes; the lump sum income or a
(iii) States may prorate income reportion thereof becomes unavailable ceived by individuals employed on a
to the family for a reason beyond the contractual basis over the period of
control of the family; or the family the contract or may prorate intermitincurs and pays for medical expenses. tent income received quarterly, semiIf the State chooses to shorten the annually, or yearly over the period
period of ineligibility, the State plan covered by the income. In OAA, AB,
shall:
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Resource Standards
Use the available resources of a household when i t is interviewed,
or as reported during the c e r t i f i c a t i o n period, to determine the
household's e l i g i b i l i t y .
These standards apply to a l l households, regardless of e l i g i b i l i t y
for other types of assistance. However, a household i n which a l l
members receive AFDC benefits and whose income is not more than the
gross income l i m i t l i s t e d on Table V has automatically s a t i s f i e d the
resource c r i t e r i a . No further examination of resources i s necessar/.

402

Maximum Allowable Resources
1.

The maximum allowable resources of a l l household members s h a l l
not exceed 32,000 for the household except:
A.

2.
404

Households with one or more members age 60 or older may
have up to 33,000 i n resources.

To q u a l i f y for expedited service, a household may not have over
$100 i n l i q u i d resources described i n Section 404, item 1.

D e f i n i t i o n of Resources
Include the following items as a household's resources:
1.

A l l l i q u i d resources, such as cash on hand, checking or saving
accounts, saving c e r t i f i c a t e s , stocks or bonds, and money
received as a nonrecurring lump sum payment; funds held i n
i n d i v i d u a l retirement accounts, ( I R A ' s ) ; and funds held in KEOGH
plans for only household members.
The funds held in KEOGH plans must not involve the household
member i n a contractural relationship with non-household
members. (For example, a husband and wife l i v i n g together could
not exclude t h e i r KEOGH plan unless a non-household member also
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e i r KEOGH plan). The value of the IRA or
KEOGH plan i s the t o t a l cash value of the account or plan minus
the amount of the penalty ( i f any) that would be lost as penalty
for early withdrawal of the e n t i r e account.

2.

A l l nonliquid resources, personal property, licensed and
unlicensed vehicles, b u i l d i n g s , land, recreational properties
and other property, provided these resources are not
s p e c i f i c a l l y excluded.

3.

The value of nonexempt resources, except for licensed vehicles,
s h a l l be i t s equity value. The equity value i s the! f a i r market
value less claims against the property.
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4.

The entire resource owned jointly by separate households counts for
each.household. However, if the household can show it has access to
only a part of the resource, count the lesser value. A resource does
not count if it cannot practically be divided, and the other owner
refuses to allow it to be sold, etc.

5.

Resources do not count for battered women and children living in
shelters when both conditions are met:
a.

The resources are jointly owned with members of their former
household, and

b.

They cannot have access to the resources without the agreement
of a joint owner living in the former household.

405 Resources of Nonhousehold and Ineligible Household Members
1.

The resources of nonhousehold members do not count. Nonhousehold
members are defined in Section 206.5. They include roomers, live-in
attendants, ineligible students and non-family members who do not buy
or prepare food with the household.

2.

The resources of ineligible household members count for the rest of^
the household. Ineligible persons are defined in Section 206.3.
They include ineligible aliens and disqualified persons. Do not
count the ineligible person when comparing the household's resources
to the resource eligibility limit.
For example, the household has an elderly person who has been
disqualified. Count the resources of all members, including the
disqualified person, and use the normal resource limit of $1,500.
Because the elderly person is disqualified, the resource limit of
$3,000 cannot be used.

3.

Apply the same rules to exempt a resource used by or for ineligible
members as for the eligible members. For example: Do not count
work-related equipment essential to the employment of an ineligible
member, nor one burial plot for such person. Do not count a vehicle
necessary to transport an ineligible member who is physically
disabled.
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406 Exempt Resources
Do not count the following items as resources:
1.

2.

The home and surrounding property which is not separated from the
home by intervening property owned by others. Public rights of way
do not count as property owned by others. Property surrounding a
home is exempt even though a road runs between it and the home.
a.

The home and property can be exempt when the home is temporarily
not occupied, as long as the household intends to return to it.
The household could be out of the home to work or receive
training, for illness or because of a natural disaster or
casualty.

b.

Do not count a lot on which household intends to build its
home. Also exempt a home being built which is not yet finished.

Household goods; personal effects; one burial plot per household
member; the cash value of life insurance policies; caskets, urns,
vaults or headstones; and the cash value of pension plans or funds,
including KEOGH plans which involve the household member in a
contract with a non-household member.
a.

IRA's must be counted as a liquid resource.

3.

Property which produces a reasonable return for its fair market
value, even if only used on a seasonal basis, such as a farm tractor,
rental home or vacation home. If such property does not produce a
reasonable return on its fair market value, count it as a resource.

4.

Farm land, work related equipment, such as the tools of tradesman or
the machinery of a farmer, and other property essential to the
employment or self-employment or a household member.
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6.

Installment contracts for the sale of land or buildings if the
contract or agreement is producing income consistent with its
fair market value• The exclusion shall also apply to the value
of the property sold under the installment contract, or held
as security in exchange for a purchase price consistent with
the fair market value of that property.
When excess property is transferred on a sales contract basis after
the date of application, the following criteria must be met:
a.

Monthly contractual payments must produce income at a
reasonable return of at least one percent of the purchase
price, AND

B.

The interest rate of the contractual agreement must include
a rate representative of a reasonable return of no less that 6%.

7.

Any governmental payments which are designated for the restoration
of a home damaged in a disaster, if the household is subject to a
legal sanction, if the funds are not used as intended; for example,
payments made by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
through the individual and Family Grant Program or disaster loans
or grants made by the Small Business Administration*

8.

Resources whose cash value is not accessible to the household, such
as but not limited to, irrevocable trust funds, security deposits
on rental property or utilities, property in probate, and real
property which the household is making a good faith effort to sell
at a reasonable price and which has not been sold.
Any funds in a trust or transferred to a trust, and the income
produced by that trust, shall be considered inaccessible to the
household if:
a.

The trust is under the control and management of an institution,
corporation or organization (the trustee) which is not under
the direction or ownership of any household member;

b.

That trustee uses the funds solely to make investments on
behalf of the trust or to pay the educational expenses of any
person named by the household creating the trust;

c.

The trust investments do not directly involve or assist any
business or corporation under the control, direction or influence
of a household member;

d.

The trust arrangement will not likely cease during the certification period; and

e.

No household member has the power to revoke the trust arrangement
or change the name of the student beneficiary during the certification period.
B-79-5-APA
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§ 273.8
specified in § 273.7(0 after the acceptance of such employment;
(vii) Acceptance of a bona fide offer
of employment ot more than 20 hours
a week or in which the weekly earnings are equivalent to the Federal minimum wage multiplied by 20 hours
which, because of circumstances
beyond the control of the primary
wage earner, subsequently either does
not materialize or results in employment of less than 20 hours a week or
weekly earnings of less than the Federal minimum wage multiplied by 20
hours; and
(viii) Leaving a job in connection
with patterns of employment in which
workers frequently move from one employer to another such as migrant
farm labor or construction work.
There may be some circumstances
where households will apply for food
stamp benefits between jobs particularly in cases where work may not yet
be available at the new job site. Even
though employment at the new site
has not actually begun, the quitting of
the previous employment shall be considered as with good cause if part of
the pattern of that type of employment.
(4) Verification, (i) To the extent
that the information given by the
household is questionable, as defined
in § 273.2(f)(2), State agencies shall request verification of the household's
statements. The primary responsibility for providing verification as provided in § 273.2(f)(5) rests with the household. If it is difficult or impossible for
the household to obtain documentary
evidence in a timely manner the State
agency shall offer assistance to the
household to obtain the needed verification. Acceptable sources of verification include but are not limited to the
previous employer, employee associations, union representatives and grievance committees or organizations.
Whenever
documentary
evidence
cannot be obtained, the State agency
shall substitute a collateral contact.
The State agency is responsible for obtaining verification from acceptable
collateral contacts provided by the
household.
(ii) If the household and State
agency are unable to obtain requested
verification from these or other

•

sources because the cause for the quit
resulted from circumstances that for
good reason cannot be verified, such as
a resignation from employment due to
discrimination practices or unreasonable demands by an employer or because the employer cannot be located,
the household will not be denied
access to the Program.
(91 Stat. 958 (7 U.S.C. 2011-2029))
[Amdt. 132, 43 FR 47889, Oct. 17, 1978]
EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER ci-

tations affecting § 273.7, see the List of CFR
Sections Affected in the Finding Aids section of this volume.
§ 273.8

Resource eligibility standards.

(a) Uniform standards. The State
agency shall apply the uniform national resource standards of eligibility
to all applicant households, including
those households in which members
are recipients of federally aided public
assistance, general assistance, or supplemental security income. However,
the State agency may consider households in which all members receive
AFDC benefits and whose income does
not exceed the gross income eligibility
standards
described
under
§ 273.10(a)(1) to have satisfied the resource eligibility criteria of this section.
(b) Maximum allowable resources.
The maximum allowable resources, including both liquid and nonliquid
assets, of all members of the household shall not exceed $1,500 for the
household, except that, for households of two or more members including a member or members age 60 or
over, such resources shall not exceed
$3,000.
(c) Definition of resources. In determining the resources of a household,
the following shall be included and
documented by the State agency in
sufficient detail to permit verification:
(1) Liquid resources, such as cash on
hand, money in checking or savings accounts, savings certificates, stocks or
bonds, lump sum payments as specified in § 273.9(c)(8), funds held in individual retirement accounts (IRA's),
and funds held in Keogh plans which
do not involve the household member
in a contractual relationship with individuals who are not household mem-

Food and Nutrition Service, USDA

§273.8

(1) The resources are jointly owned
bers. In counting resources of households with IRA's or includable Keogh by such persons and by members of
plans, the State agency shall include their former household* and
(2) The shelter resident's access to
the total cash value of the account or
plan minus the amount of the penalty the value of the resources is depend(if any) that would be exacted for the ent on the agreement of a joint owner
early withdrawal of the entire amount who still resides in the former household.
in the account or plan; and
(e) Exclusions from resources. In de(2) Nonliquid resources, personal
property, licensed and unlicensed vehi- termining the resources of a housecles, buildings, land, recreational prop- hold, only the following shall be exerties, and any other property, provid- cluded:
(1) The home and surrounding proped that these resources are not specifically excluded under paragraph (e) of erty which is not separated from the
this section. The value of nonexempt home by intervening property owned
resources, except for licensed vehicles by others. Public rights of way, such
as specified in paragraph (h) of this as roads which run through the sursection, shall be its equity value. The rounding property and separate it
equity value is the fair market value from the home, will not affect the exemption of the property. The home
less encumbrances.
and surrounding property shall
(3) For households containing spon- remain
exempt when temporarily unsored
aliens
(as
defined
in occupied for reasons of employment,
§ 273.11(h)(1)), resources shall also in- training for future employment, illclude that portion of the resources of ness, or uninhabitability caused by
an alien's sponsor and the sponsor's casualty or natural disaster, if the
spouse (if living with the sponsor) household intends to return. Housewhich have been deemed to be those holds that currently do not own a
of the alien in accordance with the home, but own or are purchasing a lot
procedures established in § 273.11(h), on which they intend to build or are
unless the sponsored alien is otherwise building a permanent home, shall reexempt from this provision in accord- ceive an exclusion for the value of the
ance with § 273.11(h).
lot and, if it is partially completed, for
(d) Jointly owned resources. Re- the home.
sources owned jointly by separate
(2) Household goods, personal efhouseholds shall be considered avail- fects, including one burial plot per
able in their entirety to each house- household member, and the cash value
hold, unless it can be demonstrated by of life insurance policies. The cash
the applicant household that such re- value of pension plans or funds shall
sources are inaccessible to that house- be excluded, except that Keogh plans
hold. If the household can demon- which involve no contractual relationstrate that it has access to only a por- ship with individuals who are not
tion of the resource, the value of that household members and individual reportion of the resource shall be count- tirement accounts (IRA's) shall not be
ed toward the household's resource excluded under this paragraph.
level. The resource shall be considered
(3) Licensed vehicles shall be extotally inaccessible to the household if cluded as specified in paragraph (h) of
the resource cannot practically be sub- this section. The exclusion also individed and the household's access to cludes unlicensed vehicles on those
the value of the resource is dependent Indian reservations that do not reon the agreement of a joint owner who quire vehicles driven by tribal memrefuses to comply. For the purpose of bers to be licensed.
this provision, ineligible aliens or dis(4) Property which annually proqualified individuals residing with the duces income consistent with its fair
household shall be considered house- market value, even if only used on a
hold members. Resources shall be con- seasonal basis.
sidered inaccessible to persons residing
(5) Property, such as farm land and
in shelters for battered women and rental homes, or work related equipchildren, as defined in § 271.2, if
ment, such as the tools of a tradesman
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(ii) The trustee administering the
or the machinery of a farmer, which is
essential to the employment or self- funds is either:
(A) A court, or an institution, corpoemployment of a household member,
except that rental homes which are ration, or organization which is not
used by households for vacation pur- under the direction or ownership of
poses at some time during the year any household member, or (B) an indishall be counted as resources unless vidual appointed by the court who has
excluded by paragraph (e)(4) of this court imposed limitations placed on
his/her use of the funds which meet
section.
(6) Installment contracts for the sale the requirements of this paragraph;
(iii) Trust investments made on
of land or buildings if the contract or
agreement is producing income con- behalf of the trust do not directly insistent with its fair market value. The volve or assist any business or corporaexclusion shall also apply to the value tion under the control, direction, or inof the property sold under the install- fluence of a household member; and
(iv) The funds held in irrevocable
ment contract, or held as security in
exchange for a purchase price consist- trust are either:
(A) Established from the houseent with the fair market value of that
hold's own funds, if the trustee uses
property.
(7) Any governmental payments the funds solely to make investments
which are designated for the restora- on behalf of the trust or to pay the
tion of a home damaged in a disaster, educational or medical expenses of
if the household is subject to a legal any person named by the household
the trust, or (B) established
sanction if the funds are not used as creating
non-household funds by a nonintended; for example, payments made from
member.
by the Department of Housing and household
(9)
Resources,
such as those of stuUrban Development through the indi- dents or self-employed
persons, which
vidual and family grant program or have
been prorated as income. The
disaster loans or grants made by the treatment
of student income is exSmall Business Administration.
plained in § 273.10(c) and the treat(8) Resources having a cash value ment of self-employment income is exwhich is not accessible to the house- plained in § 273.11(a).
hold, such as but not limited to, irrevo(10) Indian lands held jointly with
cable trust funds, security deposits on the Tribe, or land that can be sold
rental property or utilities, property in only with the approval of the Departprobate, and real property which the ment of the Interior's Bureau of
household is making a good faith Indian Affairs; and
effort to sell at a reasonable price and
(11) Resources which are excluded
which has not been sold. The State for food stamp purposes by express
agency may verify that the property is provision of Federal statute. The folfor sale and that the household has lowing is the current listing of renot declined a reasonable offer. Verifi- sources excluded by Federal statute:
cation may be obtained through a col(i) Payments received under the
lateral contact or documentation, such Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
as an advertisement for public sale in (Pub. L. 92-203, section 21(a)) or the
a newspaper of general circulation or a Sac and Fox Indian claims agreement
listing with a real estate broker. Any (Pub. L. 94-189);
funds in a trust or transferred to a
(ii) Payments received by certain
trust, and the income produced by Indian tribal members under Pub. L.
that trust to the extent it is not avail- 94-114, section 6, regarding submarable to the household, shall be consid- ginal land held in trust by the United
ered inaccessible to the household if:
States;
(i) The trust arrangement is not
(iii) Benefits received from the spelikely to cease during the certification cial supplemental food program for
period and no household member has -women, infants and children (WIC)
the power to revoke the trust arrange- (Pub. L. 92-443, section 9);
ment or change the name of the bene(iv) Reimbursements from the Unificiary during the certification period; form Relocation Assistance and Real
430
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Enter any decrease of income in the correct budgeting
cycle. Do not adjust the income any earlier than the
correct benefit month unless the person who had the income
is no longer in the BMS. For example, if a child moves
out, he is no longer included in the BMS for the month
following the change. Do not include his income because he
is no longer in the BMS.
807 Asset Standards
To compute assets for UMAP, determine total assets, deduct
exemptions. Compare the remainder to the UMAP asset limits. On
combined G-financial/G-medical cases, use the G-financial policy for
both cases.
807.1

Asset Limits
Asset limits are:
1 person in BMS:
2 or more persons in BMS:

807.2

$500
$750

Assets
Assets are anything of value that is available to the
person. Count only equity value*.
807.21

Applications and Ongoing Cases
If the asset limit is met at any time in the month, it
is met for the entire month.

807.22

Equity value

Multiple Ownership - When a person is part owner of
property, determine the person's legal right to sell
the property or his share. Multiple ownership can
exit in 3 forms.
1.

Joint tenancy. Each owner has the legal right to
sell and receive all benefit from 100% of the
property.

2.

Tenancy in common. Each owner has the right to
sell only his share. Unless a deed specifies
this share, divide the equity value by the number
of tenants in common. This is the value for each
tenant in the property.

3.

Not specified. The property is simply recorded
in the name of 2 or more persons. In thess
cases, ownership is tenancy in common.

Fair market value less anv debts against the property.
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